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Abstract in English 2 
 
Capitalism as an economic system is really cultural because it 
comprises moral meaning structures such as religion and ethics 
for individual identity. Historically Adam Smith in his theory of 
economics has attributed a moral value to economic agency 
that was sought to refine and ‘civilize’ the act of material 
accumulation. His ethical notion of self-interest has been lost 
during the transformation of economics into a separate 
academic field as well as during the rise of the Western 
European economic cultural system of capitalism. Identity is the 
site of contestation for the global economy because economic 
globalization induces a sense of self-reflexivity and self-
awareness provoking a fear of losing one’s cultural 
distinctiveness. A case study of two Turkish fashion designers 
reveals their different ideologies of identities that serve as 
business philosophy. A second, shorter case study about an 
Arabic talk show illustrates the fluid nature of Muslim identity 
that comes to blend traditional and progressive aspects for a 
unique cultural system that is bound to become reflected in 
capitalist culture. It is concluded that economic theory must be 
reformulated in order to entail the cultural dimension of 
capitalism as a meaning structure for man. 
 
 
 
Abstrakt auf deutsch 3 
 
Der Kapitalismus ist ein ökonomisches System, das von 
kultureller Natur ist und moralische Wertmaßstäbe sowie 
Religion und Ethik für die persönliche Identität beinhaltet. Adam 
Smith in seiner historischen ökonomischen Theorie hat der 
ökonomischen Tätigkeit einen moralischen Wert verliehen, 
welcher den Akt der Kapitalakkumulation veredeln und 
‚zivilisieren’ sollte. Sein ethisches Konzept von der Ökonomie 
ging im Laufe der Verwandlung der Ökonomie in ein 
Weltsystem und im Zuge der akademischen Abtrennung der 
ökonomischen Disziplin von den Geisteswissenschaften 
verloren. Identität ist der zentrale Konfliktpunkt und zugleich 
neue Angriffsfläche in der globalen Ökonomie, da mit der 
ökonomischen Globalisierung Selbstreflexivität und 
Selbstwahrnehmung geschärft werden. Es gilt, die 
Einzigartigkeit einer jeden Wertekultur gegenüber der 
gefürchteten Vereinheitlichung durch das ökonomische 
Weltsystem zu verteidigen. Ein Fallbeispiel von zwei türkischen 
Modedesignern zeigt, wie deren unterschiedliche Vorstellungen 
von türkischer Identität ihre jeweiligen 
Unternehmensphilosophien prägen. Ein zweites, kürzeres 
Fallbeispiel, handelt von einer arabischen Talkshow, welche die 
Fluidität von Identität veranschaulichen soll. Es wird festgestellt, 
daß die ökonomische Theorie umformuliert werden muß, um 
die kulturellen Dimensionen, die der Kapitalismus als 
Wertekultur innehat, in ihr Selbstverständnis zu integrieren.  
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Preface 7 
 Preface 
 
Earlier this year on his official visit to Germany Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Prime 
Minister and head of the AKP, the Turkish Justice and Development Party, declares 
that ‘assimilation is a crime against humanity’1. He is addressing formerly Turkish 
nationals that have emigrated from Turkey to Germany for work and a better life. 
When he points to the challenge of preserving Turkish identity and culture in Europe, 
Erdogan alludes to one of the most contested and remarkable phenomena of 
economic globalization, namely the processes of re-affirmation, hybridization and 
substitution of traditional identity.  
 
The question of ‘who are we’ has become predominant in an intensifying globalizing 
world. Globalization that refers to the ‘the sum total of connections and interactions 
political, economic, social, and cultural that compress distance […] and increase flow 
of goods, capital, people, ideas, and information‘2 is by no means limited to economic 
processes. But because production and technological innovation require new 
markets, natural resources and labor, the economy is a central force of the global 
networking. As it penetrates into new markets and regions and interconnects them 
through the flows of goods, technology and ideas, it initiates processes of self-
reflexivity. Through the confrontation with foreign products and different value 
systems and ideologies, ‘old’ identities are re-evaluated and sometimes re-modeled 
because of the exposure to alternative, different selves. However next to 
experiencing different realities globalization is a force that indoctrinates market 
rationality into the minds of people and politicians alike affecting ‘the [modern] state, 
society and culture’3. The ‘imperialism of the economic’4 force of globalization has 
over time led to popular understanding of a universality and omnipotence of market 
rules. When economic science split from the Humanities it separated the nature of 
man from his actions. Man’s nature ridden by emotions and irrational thinking came 
to be seen inferior to the sheer perfection and uncompromised efficiency of the 
                                                 
1
 Erdogan, Recap Rayyip. ‘Erdogan: Türkische Identität bewahren’. Die Stuttgarter Zeitung online. 
February 10, 2008. http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/stz/page/detail.php/1632469, accessed May 3, 
2008. 
2
 Haass, Richard N. Sovereignty: existing rights, evolving responsibilities. Speech at the School of 
Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University, 
Washington. January 14, 2003. U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm, accessed May 13, 2008. 
3
 Beck, Globalisierung, 27. 
4
 Ulrich Beck. Was ist Globalisierung? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1997) 27. 
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market model. An economic ideology called capitalism arises in the 18th century that 
is held to cure man from his fallibility. Over time in the 20th century this ideology 
becomes more and more pervasive on the political level. Man-made structures like 
the state are advised to interfere less, social protectionist layers are reduced and 
man is individuated thinking ‘there is no society; there are just individuals’5. This 
historical process as it will be argued here has led to an alienation of man from his 
work and from himself. He seeks to retrieve the unity experienced between his needs 
for spiritual meaning and work by asking the question of identity with more ferocity 
than ever. In a synthetic way of analysis, which seeks to maintain rather than reduce 
the complexity of globalization, the focus of this thesis is the human being that 
challenges current political, social and economic realities by a novel imagination of 
difference. The plurality of identities and values globalization entails gives impetus to 
challenging or rejecting current imperial, entrepreneurial mentality that is void of 
meaning and moral structures and that ignores social and cultural variances in its 
attempt to standardize people for consumption, production and organization.  
 
It is hypothesized that capitalism is really a cultural system that must be theorized in 
an interdisciplinary way where social and cultural aspects of man, most profoundly 
identity, are conceptualized in respect to their interaction with economics. Please 
consult Appendix one for a visual illustration of the hypothesis. The author is 
motivated by the prospect that a comprehensive theory of economics that accounts 
for the human need for identity and ethics, many negative consequences of 
capitalism can be prevented in the future. In other words when economic theory has 
a dimension of morality built into it, it will be more likely to consult the social and 
cultural factors affected by capitalist expansion, production and restructuring. An 
underlying assumption of the thesis is that identity, as aspect of culture, is central to 
economic globalization because identity provides sense, stability and security but is 
similarly challenged in an era of ‘new self-perception of transnationality 
communicated by the media, consumerism, tourism [and] the non-excludable 
perception of the other in one’s life with all the conflicting certainties’6. Man strives to 
make his identity dignified and meaningful by relating it to moral principles and ethical 
                                                 
5
 Margaret Thatcher. Interview with Douglas Keay, Woman's Own. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 
September 23, 1987. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689,  
accessed July 3, 2008. 
6
 Beck, Globalisierung, 31. 
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values that are permanent unlike the temporal nature of capitalism that favors one 
action over another based upon cost calculations and market conditions that are 
ever-changing and erratic. Man yearns for moral and ethical values beyond the 
material promises of global capitalism. Numerous previous approaches to the study 
of economic globalization either tend to analyze global capitalism in neo-Marxist 
fashion regards producer and consumer relations, or reductionist economic theory of 
rationality isolating economic realities and transformations from the socio-cultural 
context they are embedded in. This thesis is undertaking a third approach to 
economic globalization that favors a new or broader economic theory to include the 
social and cultural dimension.  
 
The author applies a critical theory approach to the way economics has been 
theorized historically and scrutinizes the basic human element of economic agency, 
namely self-interest regards its qualitative transformation from being morally 
constraint by Adam Smith’ notion of ‘sympathy’7 to unrestrained amoral egocentrism. 
Because ‘communities were sucked into the rules and rhythms of capitalist 
production’ 8  and capitalism is fragmenting and disjunctive, social, cultural and 
political realities are until today not adequately addressed by economic theory. The 
rationale for the thesis is the interdisciplinary nature of globalization and its effects on 
local economies, cultures, politics, and identities that must be part of economic 
theory in the first place. Concerning the methodology a qualitative approach is taken 
including case studies applying a phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective9. 
This method allows to critically analyze the phenomena of economic globalization in 
respect to identities and their ideologies as well as to interpret them focusing on the 
subject. When reviewing scholarly, secondary literature, those aspects that connect 
the meaning for the subject and its identity to the economic field of entrepreneurship 
are extracted. This way the perspective of subjective experience or phenomenology 
is taken to establish a general, multi-dimensional framework for recognizing the 
experiential features and subjectivities of economic globalization for a new economic 
theory based upon an improved understanding of the individual and socio-cultural 
                                                 
7
 Adam Smith. The theory of moral sentiments (Cambridge: Cambridge University press 2002) 13. 
8
 William I. Robinson. A theory of global capitalism: production, class, ad state in a transnational world’ 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 2004) 40. 
9
 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. Building theories from case study research, in: Academy of Management 
Review 14 (4) (1989). 
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phenomena of the economy. In the end the author wishes to replace the conventional 
view on economics with a more complex and integrative framework. 
 
Literature and theoretical background stem from postmodern, economic, sociological, 
and psychological theories consulting scholars like Amartya Sen, Mahmood 
Mamdani, Homi Bhabha, Adam Smith, Zygmunt Bauman and Leon Festinger on 
identity and the moral dimension of economics. A postmodern perspective will be 
applied to identity in order to highlight the substantial shifts in the way identities and 
ideas of selfhood are becoming subject to instability, insecurity and ambiguity 
projected by the deconstruction of modern ideals. The author embraces the legacy of 
being an interdisciplinary scientist to capture the overlapping and disjoining forces 
that are political, cultural, economic and social. Only under the condition that the 
complexity is conserved, the analysis of business as a space for identity construction 
and imagination is feasible. In order to draw some cross-cultural conclusions the 
author adheres to the ethics of pragmatic universalism which emphasizes the 
phenomenology of individual experiences. ‘Pragmatic universalism’ 10  allows for 
universalizing those aspects that can be considered human in the most general 
sense and are thus relatively stable across time and space and are useful for thinking 
complex relationships and interdependencies that are global. The concept of identity 
would be such a universal in this case. But nonetheless the specificities of certain 
times are acknowledged and the conclusions drawn do ‘not claim to be eternal 
truth’11.  
                                                 
10
 Martin Albrow. Do organizations have feelings? (London: Routlegde 1997) 8. 
11
 Albrow, Do organizations have feelings, 8. 
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 Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis is structured so that in the first chapter the reader is made aware of the 
qualitative changes in economic theory and practice over time. In form of a concise 
historical outline that is only meant to nuance highlights that are indicative for the 
different ways individuals relate to economic activity and of how economists reason 
about the world around them, a widening gap between economic and social theory is 
made apparent. The historical analysis commences with the industrialization and 
enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th century whilst making remarks to earlier 
periods only where necessary. The narrow time frame and the selective manner in 
which certain historical shifts are discussed are necessary to adhere to the limited 
scope of the thesis and second of all meant to highlight only the changes in the 
concept of self-interest and the aspect of identity in economics historically. Early 
philosophical re-interpretations of economics, society and man as well as Weber’s 
analysis of the nature of capitalist culture and the ethical underpinning of work during 
the industrialization period in Britain are consulted. Since the 17th century is arguably 
the origin of economic theory and therefore a sensible starting point for the thesis, 
economics metamorphoses into what is called ‘new’12 global capitalism of the late 
20th, early 21st century. In order to stress the changing nature of global capitalism in 
the late 20th century, the author suggests the term ‘radical capitalism’ for apace 
recognition throughout the paper. It is identical with the terms ‘neo-liberalism’, 
‘modern economics’ and ‘neo-classical economics’ found in the literature. All those 
labels seek to capture the qualitative mutations of economics where ‘free’ market 
forces are preferred to state regulation. For the mutation of economics into capitalist 
ideology and ‘culture’ Immanuel Wallerstein will be consulted. His world-systems 
analysis applies a historical critique of how knowledge is categorized for economic 
theory and how economic thought came to be imperial due to the way in which it 
represented scientific knowledge.  
 
In the second chapter psychological and postmodern theories of identity are meant to 
provide a theoretical understanding of the fluid nature of identity and its relation to 
economics. Arjun Appadurai’s theory of the cultural spaces of the global economy is 
presented here and related to economic agency as process of idealizing a self in 
                                                 
12
 Richard Sennett. The culture of the new capitalism (USA: Yale University Press 2006). 
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cultural terms including religious, traditional, and political aspects. In order to 
investigate the ideological motivation enmeshed in economic agency, the focus will 
be especially on the techno-, media- and ideoscapes from the overall five cultural 
landscapes in Appadurai’s model. Whilst Appadurai takes his critique of economic 
theory to emphasize the underlying cultural flows and their impact on the nation-state, 
the author utilizes his framework to set the grounds for furthering the understanding 
of the organic cultural nature of economics. Appadurai’s model of landscapes of 
cultural flows of the global economy is credited for not shying away from a cultural 
critique of global capitalism13. With the help of his multi-dimensional model the author 
aims at shedding light at the reemergence of ‘fundamentalism of local culture’14 and 
the aspect of identity that comes to be expressed in the economic and political 
spheres. At the beginning a case study of two Turkish businessmen with antagonistic 
identities projected onto their respective businesses is provided. They as agents of 
economic globalization shape the constantly fluctuating global order according to 
their ideologies of identity and will serve as illustration throughout the paper. At the 
end of the second chapter a second case study concerned with how identities are 
affected by the global media and public discourse is given. An Arab satellite TV show 
enunciates new imaginations of identity for Muslim women and proves how images 
as flow of globalization can alter one’s self-understanding stimulating processes of 
self-reflexivity just like the global economic forces do. The media and economics both 
are projection spaces for identity because they negotiate new identities. Questions 
like why has the aspect of identity become more important lately and why is the 
Islamic world attempting to moralize the economy will be tackled. 
 
It is succeeded by a third chapter on ethics that serves to recover the moral 
dimension of the global economy. It takes up the reasoned need human beings have 
for a moral sense when dedicating their lives to the disciplining of work and its 
restriction on time and family life. It also seeks to support the hypothesis that 
capitalism is a cultural system and that the original ethical foundation of economics 
must be recuperated.  
 
                                                 
13Arjun Appadurai. Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 1996). 
14
 Gijsbert Oonk. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (review), in: Journal of 
World History 11, (1) (Spring 2000) 167.  
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The fourth chapter deals with the moral leadership by political parties that have 
somewhat capitalized on the centrality and importance of identity in a globalizing 
world. Especially the Turkish Justice and Development Party appears to have 
benefited from its recognition of the aspect of identity in Turkey’s economic 
integration. Turkey’s political economy is taken as an exemplar for it provides a 
useful background for the case study on the Turkish fashion industry from the second 
chapter. It once again proves that human beings seek something beyond the material 
reality, something of cultural significance that is meaningful for identity.  
 
Finally the case will be made for a multi-dimensional global theory of economics that 
has cultural, social and political dimensions next to economic ones. The study 
concludes that identity and ethical meaning structures are not separate from the 
economic sphere, but intertwined and mutually conditioned by one another. A 
theoretical model should therefore account for the interdependence between 
ideological beliefs and economic behavior as a means to construct identity and 
personal meaning at work. Potential weaknesses and strengths of the study are 
discussed. 
 
1 Metamorphosis of Capitalism  14
1.1. Economic Globalization 
 
 Capitalism is a dualistic phenomenon that ‘demystifies […] and alienates men’15 
 
Appadurai, a prominent theorist of globalization, resumes that economic globalization 
as ‘a contradictory fusion of a territorial logic derived from the use of state power and 
a capitalist logic that derives from market-driven processes of capital accumulation in 
space and time’16 is not a new phenomenon. In fact it can be dated back to the 16th 
century ‘during which our modern world-system came into existence’17. This system 
is in serious crisis according to Wallerstein who is well-known for his world-systems 
analysis that originated in the 1970s. Globalization for him as well as other world-
system analysts is nothing new. Still the artificial separation of knowledge categories 
and the academic disciplines have contributed to a misperception of what motivates 
sellers or producers in the world to become economically active. Also they have led 
to an exclusive economic view on the philosophical concepts of self-interest and 
rationality. The ‘dominant liberal ideology of the 19th century’ 18  came to divide 
knowledge of the world in categories of ‘market, state, and the civil society’ 19 
inevitably narrowing the complexity of world phenomena. Meanwhile those points of 
view on knowledge became distributed by the economic power of the European 
nations that satisfied their increasing demand for markets and resources by annexing 
peripheral, poor regions to their imperial core markets. In these regions they then 
also distributed their market ideology. Wallerstein’s model leans on Braudel’s idea of 
‘world-economy that is not bounded by a unitary political structure […] and contains 
many cultures and groups’20. It is structurally embraced by a world-system that is 
‘systems, economies, empires that are a world’ 21  comprising a ‘spatial/temporal 
zone’22. For the reason that current deep inequalities of the world-system have a 
time-space component those should be addressed here.  
 
                                                 
15
 Anthony Giddens. Capitalism & modern social theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim 
and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971) 215.  
16
 David Harvey. From globalization to the new imperialism, in: Critical globalization studies, eds. 
Richard P. Appelbaum and William I. Robinson (New York: Routledge 2005) 91.  
17
 Wallerstein, World-systems, x.  
18
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 6.  
19
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 6.  
20
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 23. 
21
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 17. 
22
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 17. 
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Economic globalization exists because of the capitalist nature of the modern world-
economy. Due to the fact that globalization rests upon capitalist production ‘marked 
by an axial division of labor between core-like and peripheral production processes’23 
there are no territorial boundaries and local socio-cultural realities change according 
to economic processes. The notions of space change, new boundaries are drawn 
and truths and ideologies are no longer timeless. Time and space are fluid and 
transitory in Wallerstein’s model of economic globalization because ‘historical 
capitalism as a system […] rests upon global expansionism, social and regional 
polarization as well as the increasing commodification – the transformation of all 
things into goods’24. Hence, capitalist economic globalization constantly brings about 
change. His focus on the uneven distribution of power within the production networks 
across time and space elicits a central notion on the nature of economic globalization 
that is local and global at once. Wallerstein says that as a ‘singular, hierarchical world 
system, the capitalist world-economy’25 orders and structures the world in terms of its 
own logic. It divides the world into more and less important areas and imposes a 
value system onto it. In accordance with the rise of Europe as world power during 
colonialism, it was able to combine its worldview with universally-binding claims for 
social and economic development. Western Europe’s spiritual orientation towards 
Christianity for industrialization was later substituted by a sacralization of technology, 
scientific progress, and ultimately money, which was to become the capitalist culture 
transported across space and into the peripheries.  
 
Context-dependent social theory approaches like those of Appadurai and Wallerstein 
clarify that although economic globalization reassembles localities and introduces 
new identities and cultures, it does not standardize them. The creation of meaning 
remains ‘specific to locality’26 as modern lifestyles not necessarily reflect modern 
thought as conceptualized by the European thinkers. Economic globalization 
imposes structural constraints forcing people to move and re-adjust their lives and 
identities to new realities. Yet wearing blue jeans or driving a Mercedes car says 
nothing about the inner congruency with that sort of liberalism. People are free to buy 
                                                 
23
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 17. 
24Immanuel Wallerstein,. Utopistik: historische Alternativen des 21. Jahrhunderts (Wien, Promedia 
Druck, 2002) 104.  
25
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 128.  
26
 Tibi Bassam. Islamischer Fundamentalismus, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1992) 171.  
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and produce material goods without having to consort to the ideologies of the 
countries that design them27. Quite on the contrary, those ‘global’ products fulfill 
different purposes across space and are subject to ‘indigenization’28  where they 
come to convey a particular meaning for identity for the individual consumer. For 
some it is no contradiction to wear blue jeans and to believe in arranged marriage at 
the same time. This reveals the limitation to the European expansionism of its 
capitalist culture across the world. It hints to the fact that people will integrate into the 
world-system on their own terms and by their very own concepts of economics and 
identity. The global village scenario of globalization is therefore a myth and gives way 
to the idea of villages that are better connected, but nonetheless characterized by 
unique cultural norms and traditions. Limitedly the better connections according to 
Komlosy do not reach the so-called ‘terrae incognitae’29 or unknown lands that are 
like white spots on a map for they do neither exist nor matter for the ‘new geography 
of center and periphery’30. However also for those people in these ‘blind’ spaces 
identity is at stake because for them even more so it is a unique identity they are 
establishing and defending against the discriminating absorption of spaces by the 
power of money. Differences not only remain, but are more pronounced due to 
psychological needs for boundaries that originate from an attestation of selfhood that 
is unique and embedded in a wider collective. By no means is the globalizing world 
characterized by the unconditional recognition of equality of identity, dignity and 
respect. Power relations based on identity and specific cultural values remain and 
are instrumentalized along economic means, which is why the Wallerstein model of 
hierarchies is very relevant for thinking about economic globalization. Structurally-
speaking Wallerstein asserts the market as a platform of liberalism that is ‘both a 
concrete local structure in which individuals or firms sell and buy goods, and a virtual 
institution across space where the same kind of exchange occurs’31. Time and space 
are hence relative constructs in the world-system. The link between ideologies of 
identities and the global economy is entailed in the economic power game about who 
is to rule over the peripheries for cheap production, resources and market 
                                                 
27
 Bassam, Islamischer Fundamentalismus.  
28
 Arjun Appadurai. Disjunctures and difference in the global economy, in: Public Culture 2 (2) (1990) 
295.  
29
 
29
 Andrea Komlosy. Global village als optische Täuschung, in: Die Ich-Ressource: zur Kultur der 
Selbstverwertung, ed. Jan Verwoert (München: Volk Verlag 2003) 170. 
30
 Komlosy, Global village als optische Täuschung, 172. 
31
 Wallerstein, World-systems, 25. 
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opportunities. It appears that the conceptions of time and space rise and fall 
according to whoever holds power in the capitalist world-system.  
 
In conclusion the radical economy resonates on individual, cultural and political 
planes. It has been argued that economic globalization is a network of territorially-
dispersed production lines still resembling the core-periphery structures of colonial 
periods. Power and hierarchy are hence a defining characteristic of globalization. The 
question that arises then is whether the argument for a new epoch within economic 
globalization dated to the late 20th, early 21st century is correct. Are we experiencing 
a continuation of a ‘historical pattern’32 or does the world today face a novel reality? 
This question is really a structural one in reference to Wallerstein’s world-systems 
theory and can be answered by distinguishing ‘internationalization’ from 
‘transnationalization’ of capital. Whereas the former is merely ‘the extension of trade 
and financial flows across national borders’ 33 , the latter is concerned with ‘the 
functional integration of internationally dispersed activities’34 so that one can speak of 
economic globalization today as a ‘single unit in real time’35. The world-system is still 
singular and hierarchical, yet it has deeper integration of its production sites with the 
core as well as more complex structures amongst its peripheries and the core than 
before. Furthermore it has become radicalized to engage more directly with 
individuals rather than states, which marks the onset of a re-appraisal of identities 
and a qualitative shift in economic globalization overall. Today it is individuals who 
are to decide whether to converge with the dominant Western ideals of its version of 
free markets, or to endeavor an economically-integrative path of their own that 
incorporates their traditions and cultures whilst preventing economic isolation. The 
present chapter is thus a deconstructive critique of capitalist culture in respect to 
individual needs for meaningful motivation for self-interested behavior. The 
perspective taken is derived from ‘pragmatic universalism [that does not rest upon] 
scientific or religious certainties, but on the daily lived experiences of human 
beings’36. Furthermore it reasons for certain generalizations that still have validity for 
the analysis of the conditions of human existence affected by economic globalization.  
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The individual plane emerges as a powerful force because political stances either lag 
behind or are unable to provide a clear, single direction. Often the political discussion 
over how best to integrate into the global economy without losing one’s cultural roots 
has no single but a plurality of options and possibilities, so that it is left to the 
individual which one to realize. Because capital has no religious concern for 
introducing women into the workforce and propagates the accumulation of wealth by 
rational self-interest across cultures, it places the individual in a position of translating 
the language of capital carefully and considerately. The apparent indifference and 
naivety of money is re-assessed and reflected upon as it has large socio-cultural, 
economic and political consequences. Because money has no morality, the individual 
has to re-formulate traditions, ideologies and identities into a meaning structure that 
supports and legitimizes economic integration.  
 
1.2. The Transfiguration of Capitalism 
 
A historical anecdotal recollection of major shifts in the nature of capitalism is 
necessary to point out how economic globalization has historically had links to ethics 
and morals and, as it is argued, is ontologically intertwined with them. However, a 
generic definition of capitalism does not reflect the cultural, ethical aspect of 
economics and persists instead on a purely functional account. There it says that 
capitalism is a ‘system in which the production and distribution of goods is entrusted 
primarily to the market mechanism, based on private ownership of property, and on 
exchange between legally free individuals’37. This one version of capitalism entails 
the major elements of the legal, political and economic aspects capitalism in a rather 
simplistic way. It serves here to illustrate that it is flawed because it is too technical 
and end-oriented. Ignoring the social implications of widening income gaps, poverty, 
child labor and people trafficking it is not set out to provide holistic understanding of 
the processes it instigates and the consequences it has on socio-cultural and political 
levels. 
 
When looking at capitalism historically in order to understand the Western dominating 
principles of rationality and secularism for the global economy today, one must take 
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Europe as geographical site. The author will generalize the aspects of protestant 
European nations, particularly Britain, during the time of industrialization and 
concentrate on the cultural aspects of history in order to extract those historical 
relations between morals and work that can explain the malaise of global capitalism 
at present. The author acknowledges that there is a wide variety amongst protestant, 
angelical churches and apologizes for eventual generalizations that for the scope of 
the thesis are necessary at times. Still the author hopes to alleviate these 
shortcomings by offering a novel insight of the meaning the selected events have for 
reconsidering aspects of identity and morals in economic theory today.  
 
Whereas world-economies have emerged in different world regions at different times, 
currently it is predominantly Western values of the market economy that expand 
alongside with the expansion of markets. At the time when European world-economy 
became capitalist, dominant and sustainable, its epistemological understanding of 
the world and the economy also infiltrated the minds of the peripheries. In the 
Western European context, the particular notion of rationality led to the emergence of 
modern capitalism transferring power from ‘rulers, priests, [scientists], and 
entrepreneurs’38 to functionally organized bodies like ‘state, church, university, and 
the factory’39, respectively. Moral constraints on self-enrichment disappeared over 
time and were replaced by functional, secular or non-religious symbols of money. But 
before the affiliation of ethics with capitalism of the 17th and 18th century is evaluated, 
it is useful to take a short detour into the time from 1100 to 1300 when Europe’s 
economy was more dynamic than ever, cities were prospering and socio-economic 
realities improved.  
 
The prevailing negative view on accumulating wealth for one’s own sake began to 
change under the important influence of Thomas Aquinas who somewhat naturalized 
the formerly stigmatized economic aspect of human life40. Gradually it was socially 
accepted that work ‘was a part of creation’41 and private property a social necessity. 
However the pursuit of wealth continued to be seen by the spiritual authority, the 
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church, as boundless and therefore leading to ‘pride and anger’ 42 , as well as 
endangering the frugal life that was considered prerequisite for salvation. In the 12th 
century Roman civil law entered European civil jurisprudence in a time of ‘revival of 
learning’43. The protection of private property induced a sense of individualism that 
had not been there before. With the religious wars over territories and the Lutheran 
reformation of the 16th century, the Catholic Church’s prior leading role declined. The 
thinkers of the 17th century, Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza discovered the necessity to 
redirect man’s focus from religious salvation after death to the happiness found in life, 
which one is now believed to be able to influence by mundane deeds. According to 
the new thinking individuals themselves defined their goals instead of the church and 
the criteria for a satisfactory life were also individuated. Generally however society 
remained divided over the ethical nature of economics. The question of whether 
commercial life does counteract a purposeful life dedicated to sacred principles 
remains unanswered. Also Catholic clerics continued to emphasize the development 
of virtues and the participation in ‘political life’44 and warned that a shift in focus from 
the polis onto one’s self would destroy civilization. Finally, apart from these few early 
revolutionary attitudes towards money-making, being commercially active and 
handling money is opposed to moral refinement and civility still.  
 
With Voltaire in the 18th century, an intellectual who admires luxury, the formerly strict 
conceptual and ideological separation between civilization and economic prosperity 
is abandoned. ‘Abundance [is] the mother of the arts’45. This signifies the point of 
transition from religious to secular self-understanding of Western civilization that 
allows for indulgence in luxury and other temporary pleasures without having to fear 
spiritual condemnation. Capitalism arises in Western Europe as a world-system 
paralleled with secular ideals that are ‘thought to be virtually a natural law, universally 
applicable and morally right’46. Western Europe as the center embarks on explorative 
missions resulting in permanent settlements of colonialism annexing the periphery 
into a more or less global production pattern, an international division of labor and 
settlements. The West views itself as particularly advanced and therefore somehow 
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A. Before the Age of Enlightenment 
B. After the Age of Enlightenment 
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‘chosen’ to spread the universal achievement of secular economics. The 
omnipotence of economic theory and thought is ‘legitimized’ by enlightenment 
philosophy that reforms the identity of the West and its attitude to wealth. The world 
becomes gradually disenchanted by man himself for he forges his own destiny 
according to the newly arising humanistic and materialistic attitude. The shift of 
intellectual leadership in the world from the East to Western Europe is illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The westward shift in economic centre of gravity [Source: Mehmet, Ozay. Islamic identity 
and development: Studies of the Islamic periphery (London: Routledge 1990) 37.] 
 
In the 18th century Adam Smith, a moral philosopher, turns economic behavior into a 
theory that is based upon the scientific principles of rationality and reason47. So-
called ‘classical’ economy as a science presupposes self-interest, individual freedom, 
rationality and division of labor, which initiates a functionalistic understanding of 
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society and human labor as benefiting an overall whole48. The ‘enlightened’ authority 
of reason is applied to the economic model that, consequently, is stylized humanistic 
achievement. However if one was to understand Immanuel Wallerstein, Émile 
Durkheim and Max Weber as early anti-globalization critics, the European-rooted 
particular economic system and thought are dependent on distinct cultural, historical 
processes conditioned by specific inner-European, cultural transformations. The 
universality of European capitalist culture and its worldview is therefore nothing but 
imagined, but nonetheless real for they represent enforced systems of reality49. In 
conclusion European thought paves the way for the elevation of the mind and 
establishes the basis for a scientific investigation of the universe and human life. Now 
no longer God, but man’s reasoning capacity is the authority for handling the 
metaphysical questions of good and evil, truth and God. Contrary to historically 
religious morality, ethical principles are being derived from the mind by reasoning 
that it is sensible to act according to the highest maxims50.  
 
With the laws of rationality and efficiency taking prevalence in philosophical thought 
the conceptualization of work changes dramatically. The notion of self-interest plays 
an ethical role in the study of economics, yet is re-formulated over time. Especially 
once the philosophical discipline is cut off from the ‘more scientific disciplines’51 like 
economics, medicine and law, the concept of self-interest is rationalized according to 
a material world view. Technological progress, standardization of labor and scientific 
innovations substantiate the new mentality of the market and repress its ethical basis. 
In the early 20th century Max Weber foresees existential problems that the resulting 
utilitarian moral framework creates 52 . For him, once ethics become adjusted to 
economic maxims a person’s integrity and authenticity is threatened. Once only 
those aspects of ethics are pronounced that promise economic value, such as 
punctuality and diligence, ethics cease to restrain the materializing nature of 
capitalism seeking to turn everything into a commodity. For capitalist culture anything 
works as long as it produces profit. Weber’s concern for authenticity and his 
apprehension of unconstrained self-interest foreshadows the contemporary malaise 
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of radical capitalism. Money exposes a natural ‘conflict between religion and the 
world’53 and as the ‘economic medium for rationalization’54 has become the new 
center of meaning. As an early visionary of the substitution of ethics through capitalist 
culture, Franklin abandons moral concerns of money having to serve higher ends. 
Once material wealth, or plainly money, is en route to symbolize an end in itself, it 
becomes transcendental but for Weber, irrational55.  
 
1.3. Theology of Capitalism and the Cultural Specificity of 
Rationality 
 
 ‘It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the 
kingdom of God’56 
 
Before capitalist culture comes to unfold, there is a general notion that the 
consideration of work as God-given task is ‘filthy’57. Obviously, a meaningful moral 
existence is still not thought to be compatible with capitalism. Yet over time working 
hard symbolizes man’s duty for gaining God’s benevolence. Now it is one’s 
predestination to realize one’s calling into a certain profession on earth and fulfill it by 
adhering to the work ethics of discipline, punctuality and diligence. The rationalization 
of religion into a work ethic entails an intricate contradiction as professional life is 
simultaneously liberated from and infused with spiritual aspects. Work is referred to 
as ‘calling’ 58 , a ‘God-imposed task’ 59  that provides satisfaction and a sense of 
acquittal. Man is free to choose his own destiny, but bound anew by the spiritual 
working principles. For the reformer Martin Luther, work is a moral conduct that 
qualifies for God’s appreciation. Luther’s more traditional view on work as religious 
service is replaced by the rise of Calvinism. It establishes a whole ‘new relation 
between religious and mundane life’60. The Calvinists propose a new value system 
that reflects a ‘puritan world attitude’61. It can be said that historically ‘religious and 
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qualitative influences’62 are part of the expansion of capitalism. Moreover it appears 
that there are particular aspects of religious ethics that are especially advantageous 
for economic growth, particularly in Calvinism. Weber has coined the term 
‘Wahlverwandtschaften’ 63  or elective affinity whereby certain aspects of religion 
benefit economic development. He recognizes the particularity of the Western 
European cultural and religious adaptations and is convinced of the cultural-
dependency of capitalism. However when he analyzes the cross-cultural differences 
in moralizing wealth, he also indirectly, questions the universality of economics and 
its assumed cultural indifferent principles like rationality and self-interest. Somewhat 
contradicting his own findings on the cultural specificity of economic development in 
the Islamic world Weber manifests an absence of rationality in Islamic law as the 
reason for much of the economic underdevelopment there at the time64. Perhaps not 
on purpose, Weber recuperates the Western illusion of superiority when he holds the 
cultural and not the structural factors accountable for the Islamic world’s economic 
inferiority of the time. He falls short of applying his discovery of economics’ 
dependence on cultural factors to his own terminology, which he uses to scrutinize 
other cultural contexts invariably. Especially Islamic states and Muslim intellectuals 
protest against a narrow definition of rationality and self-interest. They attempt to 
harmonize mundane and sacral life by ‘Islamic economics [that is] founded on Islamic 
principles’65 and ‘distinctively Islamic identity’66. Again cultural factors purport the kind 
of capitalism that will unfold so that it supports a specific worldview and a sense-
making structure legitimizing material accumulation. The problem of global capitalism 
today is to be found in the plurality of capitalisms that seek to integrate into the world-
system that however is dominated by Western notions of rationality and self-interest. 
This explains why Islamic economics as an overarching anti-model to Western 
capitalism remains an alternative only in theory so far. Simply the world-system is 
dominated by a few mostly Western cores that have the power to impose their 
interpretations of capitalist culture that are also propagated by the supra-national 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)67. For 
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Wallerstein the crisis of the 21st century is really one of the 16th century68 because the 
16th century gave rise to the current world-system founded on a specific, material 
motivation of self-interest. The greed for profit and the very nature of capitalism as 
‘endless accumulation of capital’ 69  finally produce socio-cultural and political 
resistances. An illustration is given in chapter four that deals with the Turkish political 
leadership on Turkey’s identity for economic integration.  
 
Since the 1980s capitalism has reached an intolerable level of domination on 
people’s lives everywhere. People and markets are in direct confrontation through 
production, consumption and sophisticated technology enabling global media to 
broadcast the experience of simultaneity. Increasingly unique, culturally-adapted 
‘rationalizations’ of spiritual life in respect to economic structuring are sought. 
Calvinism may validate Western European and American socio-cultural adjustments 
to capitalism, yet it does not hold for other parts of the world. Turkey, the geo-political 
site for one of the case studies is in the process of finding a Turkish rationalization 
and integration into the world-system. There religion is increasingly re-infused into 
the political and economic sphere, contrary to the Western rationalization and 
modernization model. Islam and economic growth together are to achieve what 
secularization and privatization of religion have done in Europe. Arguably then this 
Turkish kind of capitalist culture is ‘rational’ despite the fact that this economic 
ideology is not secular and rational in the European sense.  
 
The inconsistency of Weber’s concept of ‘rational’ self-interest has led to conflate 
secularism with rationality70. The originally ethical underpinning of self-interest is lost 
and disappears behind the economic sciences’ understanding of self-interest as 
something that is secular and functional. Patricia Crone argues that Weber conflates 
functionality with rationality in his definition71. And because functionality is ‘immune’72 
to religious and ethical principles, it is exclusively end-oriented. It ‘reduces value to 
function’73. And functionality as such is no ethical measure that would satisfy moral 
concerns about economic principles changing societies and identities on their behalf.  
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In conclusion, ‘formal rationality’74 is nothing but a result of the particular, European 
historical evolution of economics as a science. Yet it has been driving the world-
system and the major supra-national organizations. The historical progression 
elucidates how self-interest has been ontologically mutated from an ethical concept 
to a self-serving, functionalized understanding legitimizing the current Western 
dominated world-system.  
 
1.3.1. Theorizing Economics: Is It Right to be Self-interested? 
 
Self-interest as sole ethical paradigm plays a critical role for how economic behavior 
is motivated. It also explains why there are cultural differences in the philosophy of 
economics and the desire to adapt it to personal, cultural realities. Ancient 
philosophers like Aristotle but also the present-day terrorist al-Qaeda group, reject a 
functional self-interested view on capitalism75. But the West continues to dominate 
the world-system generalizing the rational choice paradigm as if it were a universal 
principle and propagates a particular worldview that is rationality-based and 
consequentialist or end-oriented76. 
 
Western capitalist culture as already mentioned is derived from economic theory that 
has over time separated itself from the Humanities and Social Sciences. Indeed over 
the centuries, the scientific study of economics has been modified considerably. 
Today the strict departmental separation of social and economic sciences creates the 
impression that economics is independent of ethics, despite the natural linkage of 
ethical factors and work by the disciplining values of dedication, diligence and 
punctuality. Those ethical constraints on behavior require justification beyond the 
material benefits just like the Protestant ethic used to provide. Ignoring the 
conditionality of a healthy cultural and social environment for economic behavior to 
unfold, economic theory becomes reductionist implying that capitalism is only 
concerned with ‘money as an exchange medium’77. The notion of ethical principles to 
guide behavior and interpret working life comes to be seen as irrelevant for money 
itself is sought to replace the spiritual needs. Walter Benjamin views money as 
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guarantor of freedom, autonomy and opportunities. He indeed was a forerunner in 
conceptualizing economics as independent of ecclesiastic approval. Approximately 
since the 19th century economics considers itself no longer ontologically 
encapsulated by ethics, but manifests itself as universal theory indebted to the 
principles of European enlightenment of secular rationality. The ‘disembedding of the 
economy from the society during the 19th century in Europe and the liberation of the 
market from social constraint’78 has thus been another historical turning point in the 
metamorphosis of capitalism. However religion and morals continue to play a 
significant role in the individual’s relationship to the world of work and money.  
 
1.4. The Money Economy as Threat to Social Continuity 
 
From a political economic perspective there are ‘qualitative differences between the 
world in the early 20th and the world in the early 21st century’79. Those differences are 
the ‘fragmentation and decentralization of complex production chains and the 
worldwide dispersal and functional integration of the different segments in these 
chains’80. Notably this fragmentation together with the ‘centralization of command 
and control of the global economy in transnational capital’81 are what the author calls 
the radical global economy. The radicalizing global capitalism is an emerging new 
phase in the world-system pointing to ‘the supersession through transnational 
integration of national economies’82. It is radicalizing because it further fragments 
‘production processes and [and fosters] their geographic relocation on a global scale 
in ways which slice through national boundaries’83. Furthermore the radical nature of 
global capitalism has influenced national governments to restructure local economies 
and societies to suit ‘the needs of transnational capital’84. It can be said that capitalist 
culture has come to dominate man on all other non-economic levels as well. The new 
emerging ‘class relations of global capitalism’85 will not be further discussed as this 
thesis is not a systemic analysis on global production relations. The term neo-
liberalism is used here interchangeably with radical capitalism and the global 
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economy as it basically characterizes the same processes of economic deregulation 
and trade liberalization. Neo-liberalism views the role of the state reduced in favor of 
an increased focus on the private business sector and is advocated by economists 
and politicians of the 20th and 21st century like the businessman Kenichi Ohmae, the 
former president of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, and Britain’s former Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. This new economico-political mentality has not only 
structural but ‘ubiquitous effects on lives’86. Since the 1980s global capitalism causes 
postmodern deconstructivist processes of alienation from ‘classical’ sources of self 
like the nation, the organization, the family, towards an individuation of man in center 
and periphery alike. This shift is also quantitatively confirmed by Inglehart who 
speaks of the ‘importance of cultural change’87 in the 1980s that is equivalent to a 
‘global change in advanced industrial society’ 88 . At this point the importance of 
nationality declines and the global is no longer mere effect but ‘objective reality’89. 
The new global economy is ‘where human beings assume obligation towards the 
world as a whole and where they espouse values which take the globe as their frame 
and reference point’90. This marks therefore the point where values and morals are 
re-integrated into the economy because the global exposure makes individuals more 
conscious of the negative effects of the functionalist, rational kind of capitalism. For 
Appadurai this is the ‘global now’ 91  meaning global presence within the local 
instigating self-reflexive processes for new meaningful identities in the material world. 
Individuals as agents are ‘able to contest and sometimes even subvert the imagined 
worlds of the official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them’92, 
which will be discussed in the second chapter.  
 
Money as central instrument of economics encourages the spread of the neo-liberal 
capitalist logic because it is non-contextual. In other words, money is the same 
everywhere in the world, yet money ‘is never just money’93. Money is most of all 
ambiguous as it produces ecological and social miseries alongside an abundance of 
wealth and autonomy for the few. The power of money is analyzed in various studies 
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by Richard Sennett, a scholar from Yale University94. What is called radical global 
capitalism here Richard Sennett conceptualizes as ‘new capitalism’95 that he dates to 
the late 20th century, more exactly the 1980s. In his book he analyzes the new social 
realities according to identity and organizational adaptations in the Western world, 
which means North America and Europe. Central to Sennett’s argument is the 
adaptation of individual identities according to market logic96. As a result a so-called 
homo oeconomicus internalizes economic fragmentation to successfully manage 
‘short-term relationships, […] ‘develop new skills [alongside technological change, 
and to be able to] let go of the past’97. This ‘new’ man reminds more of a machine 
that is tuned to making money than of a human being with emotional and spiritual 
needs. Sennett’s social critique on the relationship between economic ideology and 
identity states that the new man is not liberated in his being, but rather encased in his 
function as a worker. Sennett just like the earlier historical critics is concerned about 
the loss of human dignity and questions whether capitalism whilst leading to wealth 
and liberty for some sacrifices moral refinement and civilization of the world.  
 
It can be said that the radical global capitalism is amoral and ahistorical because it 
spreads its materialistic philosophy globally and abandons its historical roots. Radical 
capitalism becomes a ‘life world’ where people are expected to socialize and develop 
a ‘sense of belonging’98 individually. With the end of the 20th century ‘the moral 
prestige of work’99 declines because ‘the social [within work] is diminished’100. As 
work forms become increasingly competitive and harsh, people feel disappointed by 
the empty promises of money that are not fulfilled on their own but ‘necessitate the 
interpretation of acting individuals’101. Those create the meaning structures and role 
models for which it is worth working hard. Hence money is not just functional, it is 
substantial. It is meaningfully interpreted by man in order to make its ambiguity of 
inclusion and exclusion, success and failure, change and stagnation, tolerable. In 
short money means ‘reflexivity’102 on the basis of cultural and societal continuity.  
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1.5. Chapter Summary 
 
In Western Europe economics used to be an ‘offshoot of ethics’ 103 , but it has 
transformed into a separate scientific field since the enlightenment period under 
Adam Smith in the 18th century. A little earlier the religious reformation in the 16th and 
17th century facilitates the functionalization of self-interest and the rationalization of 
motivation for making money. Religious aspects are modified into a work ethic to 
cultivate capitalist culture. During the 20th and 21st century yet another mutation 
abandons ethics altogether and ‘liberates’ capitalism from previous ethical concerns. 
Instead capitalism is sought to fulfill spiritual needs by its promises of wealth and 
autonomy. This ideology fails as the dream of wealth continues to be realized only for 
the elites whilst the majority remains peripheral to capitalism’s promise. The promise 
of absolute wealth as a sacred unleashes self-interest, greed and egocentrism that 
become highly contested within and outside of the world-system. Therefore money’s 
salvation promise still requires a meaningful motive that is not material. The first 
chapter can be concluded by saying that the Socratic question of ‘how should one 
live’ re-emerges with unprecedented urgency in the global economy. The ambiguity 
of money leads to the challenging of present-day dominant capitalist culture and 
relativizes European, economic epistemological frameworks. In the meantime this 
ambiguity has spread to an overall confusion about how to integrate identities and 
ideologies into the world-system that has exposed its weaknesses.  
 
It is the impact and centrality of the cultural factors of the economy that reveal the 
true nature of capitalism as a cultural system. The ‘epistemological and ethical 
challenge’104 posed by radical global capitalism is met with ‘own ideas’105 such as the 
Islamic banking system. The question of ‘who are we’ has become a central theme of 
the globalization debate because the more the world grows together, the greater the 
fear of losing one’s distinctiveness as a people. When globalization is felt as a direct 
threat to one’s unique self, it obtains emotional qualities that can spur violent 
eruptions no global theorist can afford to ignore. A correct understanding of the 
nature of the economy as a cultural system is the first step in putting an end to 
idealizing the scientific character of economics. Instead it will pave the way for a 
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historical reconnection that captures the human aspect of identity and ethics as part 
of capitalist culture.  
2 Identities  
 
32
2. Case Study One:  
 The Cultural Aspect of the Economy 
 
 ‘It is not our human nature that is universal, but our capacity to create cultural realities,  
 and then to act in terms of them’106 
 
This first case study is about two different imaginations of Turkish identity and 
different ethical interpretations of material accumulation by two entrepreneurs in the 
Turkish fashion industry. Fashion is itself an instrument for identity where ‘fashion 
unites those of [one] social class and segregates them from another’107 so that it has 
relevance not only in an illustrative but deeper sense. Fashion is materializing the 
inner dualistic nature of human beings that is faltering between ‘social adaptation’108 
and differentiation like no other product. The sociality of fashion has caught the 
attention of Georg Simmel, one of the first German sociologists in the 20th century 
who has defined the socio-cultural function of fashion as ‘the objective characteristic 
grouping upon equal terms by social expediency of the antagonistic tendencies of 
life’109. Fashion is therefore tied to both, the social and the imaginary aspect of the 
ideologies of identities within the global economy. Thus the two different fashion 
styles created by the two designers reflect a more fundamental discrepancy over the 
values for Turkey’s self-image.  
 
In February of 2008 the author came across an intriguing documentary screened by 
the Public Broadcasting Service, PBS, called ‘The new face of Islam’110. It presented 
the largest Islamic-style fashion chain, Tekbir, and another flourishing fashion 
business brand called Ipekyol that is selling Western-style clothes in Istanbul, Turkey. 
The documentary itself is subdivided into four parts, ‘Faith and prosperity in Turkey’, 
‘Anatolian Tigers’, ‘The Rise of conservative Islam’, ‘Faith, Fashion, and the future’111. 
Each part is running between six to thirteen minutes each adding up to the overall 
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length of forty 40:33 minutes. The documentary itself can be downloaded from the 
PBS website and additional information by the film makers is given in Appendix 3.  
 
Turkey is a Eurasian, transcontinental country with a portion of its landmass lying 
‘west of the Bosporus and [being] geographically part of Europe’112 as can be seen in 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Turkey [Source: Central Intelligence Agency. The world fact book on Turkey. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, accessed June 10, 2008.] 
 
It stretches from south-eastern Europe to south-western Asia bordering the Black 
Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria113. It has 81 provinces and borders 
eight countries, which are Bulgaria to the northwest, Greece to the west, Georgia to 
the northeast, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran to the east, and Iraq and Syria to the 
southeast114. It also has access to several waters such as the Mediterranean Sea, 
the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Turkish Straits which 
comprise the Bosporus and the Dardanelles115. It is estimated that Turkey’s ethnic 
population is comprised of 80 percent Turkish and 20 percent Kurdish people116. 
Socio-economically Turkey is a country that is secular by law and relies heavily on 
the state and its jurisprudence for the strict separation of religion and politics. School 
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curricula are under state supervision and so are the Imams and their religious 
teachings of Islam. Yet there has been a notable reorientation to conservative Islamic 
principles in recent years that causes a divide within the nation.  
 
The two selected business owners are an illustrative example of that divide where 
the one, Mr. Karaduman who runs Tekbir, is representing the conservative religious 
side that is nonetheless economically liberal, and Mr. Ayaydin who is a secular, 
Western-oriented businessman. Mr. Karaduman follows a strict interpretation of Islam 
and produces Islamic clothing for devoted Muslim women. Particularly proud is Mr. 
Karaduman of the full-body swim suit that allows Muslim women to take a bath in the 
ocean as he says. His mission is to introduce Tekbir, which had a 15 percent 
increase in sales in 2005, to all women in the world, particularly in Europe, but also in 
Egypt. For Mr. Ayaydin on the contrary his goal is to be famous and to open stores in 
Europe and the United States. He argues that Turkey must look west and never look 
back117. By expanding within the home market and abroad however, both business 
owners seek to simultaneously expand the philosophy they associate with their 
product. For Mr. Karaduman it is important that the ongoing modernization of Turkey 
and its participation in the global capitalist system does not change or weaken 
Islamic culture. He wants to preserve the religion, yet without isolating the country. 
For Mr. Ayaydin on the other hand Turkey’s opening to the world does not erode but 
strengthen Turkey’s identity as a secular, Western-oriented culture. For him Western 
capitalist culture is hence not a threat as it is for Mr. Karaduman.  
 
When Mustafa Karaduman from the ‚largest Islamic-style fashion chain Tekbir’118 
rises at 4:45 am in the morning he follows his Islamic cleansing rituals. For Mr. 
Karaduman from Tekbir, his identity within the commercial world is formulated not by 
Western economic principles of self-interest but by the religion of Islam to which he 
uncompromisingly devotes and subjugates his entrepreneurial activities to. Mr. 
Karaduman is a devout Muslim, and his identification with the global economy is 
based upon religious considerations and as it seems traditional Turkish identity. 
Religious identity is defined by Grace Davie as traditional cultural phenomenon and 
cultural continuity so that not much will be said about the particularity of Islam itself119. 
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When taking a closer look Mr. Karaduman’s identity is not traditional because it is not 
a direct imitation of a former, ‘old’ Islamic identity. Whilst individual Islamic identities 
may have existed in Turkey ever since its founding in 1923 until recently never 
represented a broader collective identity that was politically recognized as such. 
Therefore Mr. Karaduman has constructed a novel Turkish Islamist identity that 
seeks economic integration with the West, approves of employing women at work 
and persists on a traditional role for his wife to stay home. Therefore Mr. Karaduman 
is a hybrid representation of postmodern identity negotiating self and ideology of 
identity through entrepreneurial agency. He and other Islamic entrepreneurs 
exemplify the ‘imagined worlds’120 where ideologies of ‘proper’ Turkish identity are 
merged with the economic ambition to establish Turkey in the globalizing economy. 
Religiously-inspired entrepreneurs like Karaduman pursue ‘wealth, faith, and 
fashion’121 because for them the economic sphere is not separate from how they 
interpret the world and their role within it. They ‘represent a new face of Islam; one 
that is ‘devout and profit-driven’ 122 . Karaduman justifies his economically self-
interested behavior by the two pillars of Islam that are about business, ‘Hajj’ and 
Zakat’123. The former requires profit for financing the pilgrimage to Mecca and the 
latter for paying alms to the poor. Out of the five pillars of Islam the other three are 
‘Shahadah, Salat, and Sawm’124. They are concerned with worship like performing 
ritual prayers five times a day, fasting during Ramadan and ‘reciting the Muslim 
profession of faith’125. Hence, his economic activity is relevant for his religiously-
defined self. Moral concerns of self-interest have apparently not disappeared in the 
Turkish Muslim world that seeks to find its own, particular route into the global 
economy. For Karaduman faith represents a business opportunity as well as it 
strengthens his ideology about a strict interpretation of the Koran and the 
‘appropriate’ role of Turkish women. However he eases his strict Islamist identity 
outside of the home and employs women out of economic necessity. Next to his 
dream of expansion his mission is to ‘make conservative Islam fashionable’126 and to 
spread its influence across the world, especially across Europe and the Arab world. 
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Consequently his business mission differs from the secular contestations by Western 
entrepreneurs in the textile industry. Karaduman ‘builds his business on his religious 
mission’ 127  and his business activity lays claim to be serving Allah before 
stockholders and consumers. ‘Tekbir’ which for Turkish Muslims means ‘the one and 
only God’128  counters money’s absolutist promise mentioned in the first chapter. 
Money alone is not producing sense for Karaduman and his business. Money in his 
world can only make sense if it is subjugated to a higher, religious purpose. This 
implies that capitalism is utilized by individuals with different cultural, identitarian and 
religious affinities and serves not just the economic principle of profit-maximization, 
but caters to one’s interpreting of society and recuperates identity in a fluctuating and 
relativizing world.  
 
Islamic entrepreneurs like Karaduman configure a hybrid form of capitalism that 
appears to mirror their hybrid identities and ‘illustrate that Islam, capitalism and 
globalization can be compatible’129. Many of the products that are produced in the 
export zones of the Kayseri region ‘do not match [the] traditional lifestyles’130 of the 
devout Muslims working there. But because money has no religious or moral 
concerns it applies its logic across the peripheries and offshore production centers. 
The workers from Kayseri however do only superficially agree with this de-contextual 
and amoral understanding of the economy. According to them one must make his 
‘own choices according to own cultural, moral values’131 that apparently are not being 
transported and automatically ingested by the periphery. The Kayseri region lies in 
‘Turkey's central province and [is the] Islamic heartland of Anatolia’132. It has about 
‘1.1 million inhabitants and a workforce of 150,000’133 that ‘produces 70 percent of all 
furniture sold in Turkey and 1 percent of the denim worn around the world’134 ‘The 
industrial zone outside the city spreads out over 2350 hectares and is home to more 
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than 500 production facilities’135. Even though Kayseri has no direct access to the 
sea its ‘exports have doubled since 2000 to about €540 million’136.  
 
The notion that ‘industrialization should not change Islamic culture’137 highlights the 
re-formulating of meaning structures for different cultures and identities. The sources 
for rationalizing religion for entrepreneurial activity are resulting in a new face of 
Islam in Turkey. A rational explanation for Turkish workers and businessmen is 
ultimately faith-bound and a clear contradiction to the concept of rationality stemming 
from European enlightenment. It is the Islamic culture, which gives Turkey and its 
entrepreneurs a specific identity that is sought to be preserved and emphasized in 
economic agency. Because ‘you cannot find this culture anywhere else in the 
world’ 138  global economic participation and integration is accompanied by the 
process of self-reflexivity stressed throughout the paper. As has been illustrated 
before, the individual now can re-establish identity anew in hybridity, reject the 
changing of traditional roles altogether, or idealize traditionality like the Islamic 
entrepreneurs do. But importantly, the emphasis on traditional Islamic rules and 
lifestyles is in Karaduman’s case really the result of a new hybrid identity. Similarly 
Erdogan Aslan, president from Kar-as, a company within the globally-annexed 
Kayseri region, says that ‘women should play more productive role [in business]’139. 
He also more or less resigns over his wife who next to holding the driver’s license 
becomes more and more independent having her own imaginations and aspirations 
increasingly outside of the home. So even for devout Muslim women in one of the 
most conservative regions in Turkey new identities are emerging with the help of 
economic integration, expansion and transmission of ideas from abroad that provides 
possibilities and new self schemas. It is ‘a new Islamist female identity’ 140  that 
foresees education and a career as well as familial responsibilities for the woman. It 
is similarly a political expression of an alternative path to Turkish modernity where 
the ‘tesettür’141 or the new veiling phenomena constructs an identity that is outward 
and useful economically, yet inward and private socially. It is a space in-between this 
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new Islamic identity occupies and is an attempt to secure an identity that is Islamic 
and progressive at once. This new female identity could put an end to the under-
representation of women in Turkey’s workforce where women only ‘represent 29 
percent of the professionals’142.  
 
For the mayor of Kayseri it is clear that people ‘want to preserve traditions [and] 
religion [but not at the expense of] being isolated from the world’143. If ‘the important 
thing is to make money’144 then religion and identities must re-establish the historical 
affinity between capitalism and a meaningful moral existence. This is exactly what 
the Muslim entrepreneurs of the Kayseri region like Karaduman are motivated for and 
by. On Fridays workers and company presidents substitute their lunch break for 
prayer that provides that moral value for business. More than 6000 people overcrowd 
the mosque there and businessmen continue building more mosques145. One can 
only speculate that with the economic expansion and globalization of Kayseri, the 
number of mosques will increase exponentially. This would be the direct effect of the 
Islamic business rule to share the profit with the faithful community. Kayseri and its 
Muslim entrepreneurs is a perfect example for a theoretical framework of the cultural 
processes involved in economic activity. The blend between modern and traditional 
Muslim trends is a response to the engagement of Turkey with the global economy. It 
serves to confirm that economic integration is also always cultural.  
 
Yalcin Ayaydin the founder of Ipekyol on the other hand embodies the ‘typical’ 
secular Turkish business elite with its traditional Western orientation. Ayaydin’s 
fashion chain is called ‘Ipekyol’, which stands for ‘silk road’ 146  and hints at the 
historical trading route between Asia and Europe that transmitted culture and foreign 
products alike147. Ayaydin’s mission resembles much more that of a typical Western 
business man. All he wants is to become ‘one of the most famous brands in 
Turkey’148. His ideology and identity he interlaces with his business clashes with that 
of Tekbir. His daughter is permitted drinking alcohol and lives a lifestyle that is nearly 
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identical to that of a wealthy teenager from Hollywood. She does neither possess nor 
wear a head scarf and already prepares to succeed her father in the successful 
business as a designer one day. She watches American TV shows and finds 
‘headscarves not useful’149 . For her ‘the guys at Tekbir are fundamentalists’150 . 
Ayaydin distances himself from the religiously-defined entrepreneurial identity of 
Karaduman and says that ‘they [Islamic entrepreneurs like Karaduman] can make 
that kind of world for themselves’151. The contestation of identity in the economic 
realm is expressed even in a fear of Ayaydin’s daughter who says that ‘when they 
[Tekbir] are economically stronger, they want to change the country and make it 
more Islamic’152. The success of secular compared to Islamic businesses and their 
parallel partaking in the global economy is also part of the divided political attitude 
towards the structural transformation of the country. It is therefore useful to discuss 
the politicization of economic and cultural identity, especially in regards to the recent 
‘Islamization’ of Turkey in chapter four. 
 
2.2. Identity as Central Site of Contest for Capitalist Culture 
 
The first chapter on the historicity of capitalism has pointed to the cultural aspect of 
economics. It appears that historically there has always been an attempt, notably by 
Max Weber to supply economic changes with a human quality. A meaning structure 
like the protestant ethic was to be the foundation for managing the ambiguity of 
capitalism that is progressive and deconstructive at the same time. Rather ironically 
the ambiguity of capitalist culture deconstructs capitalism as ideology of progress and 
modernization. Because it emerges with the enlightened philosophy of ‘human rights, 
but also with sexism, racism and ageism’153 its prognosis of progress is relative and 
not impartially adopted abroad. Instead it is reflected upon and carefully weighted 
against its effects on local culture and sociality. For in the global economy capitalist 
culture is often felt as ‘forceful extension of [Western European] definitions of 
reality’154.  
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Weber was fascinated by Fordism of the early 20th century and its ‘development 
dynamic’ 155 . For him capitalism meant human progress and technological 
achievement, but also the crunch down of ‘anything that gets in the way of capitalist 
culture’156. The qualitative changes in economic theory and practice have shown the 
‘human consequences of globalization’ 157 . It is the culture of capitalism that is 
ambiguous because it lays bare the ‘naked interests’158 of human beings that appear 
to lose their ethical commitment over time as self-interest determines their survival in 
the competitive environment. Whether one is motivated by a strong work ethic, the 
promise of salvation after having fulfilled one’s duty on earth, or simply money, it all 
comes down to one purpose: surviving in the competitive capitalist culture. The 
fascination of wealth, grand projects and fame establish an own culture, the culture of 
capitalism and of money. For Weber at this point capitalism ‘congeals into a steel 
cage’ 159  that comes to dominate man. The freedom of man is significantly 
compromised and left within a struggle for recuperating meaning beyond the material 
relations of production inputs and outputs. The meaning of man is lost once material 
relations reason about ‘how to live’. ‘Capitalism is cultured’160 and reasons in ways 
that are alien to man who desires a sense-making structure and a moral obligation to 
adjust his life forms and to discipline his behavior in order to subordinate himself to 
production.  
 
The first chapter concluded by saying that the ‘conceptual boundaries’161 between 
the social and the economic fail to grasp the phenomena of capitalist culture going 
global in its complexity. The goal is to evoke a renewed appreciation of aspects of 
meaning, identity and ideology that are projected onto the economic sphere by man. 
The thought construct of ‘globality’162 is meant to take the step of economic theory 
beyond the ‘modern’ disciplinary isolation into the interdisciplinary field of 
globalization. The current shortcoming of academic departmental and conceptual 
separation is meant to be abolished by the prospect of a new thinking stream: global 
studies. The individual is hence conceptualized as embedded within the economic 
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field that itself again is part of a broader, globality structure. Globality is defined by 
Beck, a famous sociologist of globalization, as the demarcation of an era where the 
separation of spaces or territories has come to an end163. Beck says that in a time of 
globality ‘different economic, cultural, and political forms clash and the implicitness of 
the Western model must be newly legitimized’164. Worldly relations and phenomena 
are multi-disciplinary and cross-territorially. Moreover the nature of globalization, that 
is the ‘processes through which orientations, identities and networks undermine 
nation-states and their sovereignty [whilst being internally] connected with each 
other’165 induces a general sense of self-reflexivity’166. The market is felt as a global 
reality exerting competitive forces and pressures across nations and inside localities. 
This will also be referred to as deterritorialization, which signifies the ‘removing of 
misplaced concreteness from sociological concepts [and the] delinking of community 
from place’ 167 . The concept of deterritorialization serves to ‘emphasize the 
contribution of imagination to social reality [and is related to the thesis’ methodology 
of] radical phenomenology’168. It is also related to identity that is sourced from an 
imaginary capacity ‘relativizing old identities’169. Importantly it does not argue that the 
territoriality of core and periphery structures of the world-system has vanished. 
Rather the ‘social construction of reality’ 170  has changed from being locally, 
territorially framed to being global. The second case study is an example of this 
global social reality and how it comes to affect individual identities. Deterritorialization 
also explains then why there are peculiar phenomena emerging such as Islamic 
capitalism. The second chapter on identities seeks to point to the role of identity in 
the ‘realities of global forces, power and markets’171 in which everyone pursues his 
own interests. The global forces are ideologies, capital, technology, and values that 
fluctuate between spaces and affect how people think about themselves and what 
they do. Boundaries of ‘territorial, moral, or aesthetic nature’172 are broken up and 
new blends of values systems are the result of reflecting upon old identities defining 
the strategies and visions taken by economic entrepreneurs.  
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The problem of identity is central to the global economy because the global forces 
have changed agency and structure making identity a central site of contest and 
status in the world. Psychological theory is implicit to the sociology of the individual 
that makes its ‘own selections’173 about incorporating new aspects of self around 
which it has the ‘ability to construct narratives’174. Affirming an identity in the radical 
global economy is extremely challenging as the social environment is ambiguous due 
to the relativizing forces of capitalism. An identity in the global economy is situated 
within fluidity due to ‘rapidly changing self-descriptions’175. The new category for 
identity which will be established in this chapter is the imagination. Importantly 
imagination is not confined to the social sphere because the social is not marginal to 
economics but integral. The integrality of the social and the cultural to economics is 
not just due to the social effects economics produce, but to the very nature of 
economics itself. Clear is that the end of economics is to make profit. But as it is in 
the nature of human beings to dedicate a moral outlook on what they do that is 
sense-making to their identity harmonizing self and work, economics is a social and 
cultural system. The focus will be on the cultural dimension as it comprises of identity, 
religion and ethics. The cultural and the economic, together create an ethical, moral 
underpinning and a sense-making structure that affirms and reproduces identity on 
the way to making profit. As a result a new concept of economics as meaning-
generating structure that gives rise to identity arises.  
 
Limitedly identity has ‘an abstract quality’176 that is difficult to empirically evaluate. 
Nonetheless it is necessary to establish an intellectual access to the phenomena of 
ideologies of identities in the global cultural economy. Lastly the phenomenological 
approach to identity is worthwhile because it will change the way in which economics 
is conceptualized; namely in a purely and exclusively ‘scientific’, quantitative way. 
Hence it is argued on a historical and phenomenological basis that economics is a 
cultural and social structure that gives meaning to the activity of production and 
wealth accumulation and is thus integral to identity. Identity is to be understood as 
the component of the personalization and moralization of work. Culture is the broad 
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umbrella under which identity and morality can be classified as it gives symbolic 
meaning to human experiences at work and in general.  
 
2.3. Economics as Cultural System for Identity 
 
 ‘The circuit of culture’177 helps to classify identity as aspect of culture. Accordingly 
culture compasses economic, social, and symbolic realms of ‘production, 
consumption and representation’178, respectively. Identity plays a significant role in a 
globalizing world and requires difference and boundaries. It has been conceptualized 
as ‘biological essentialism [and] social constructionism’ 179  whereas the latter 
understanding of identity is applied here due to the vast amount of evidence 
indicating a fluctuation of how identities are constructed that cannot be biologically 
explained. For instance, when former national units are broken up such as the case 
in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, new identities are formed based upon a novel perception 
of self. The non-essentialist idea of identity implies that it is changing over time and 
shaped by factors such as production patterns, political structures, imagination and 
symbolism. For example Karaduman’s manager serves dates and holy water during 
a business meeting, which is the kind of symbolism present in economic 
organizations. Through the power of representation Karaduman’s business interprets 
its economic goal of making profit meaningfully, in this case religiously. For the 
worker on the other hand, is less powerful than the entrepreneur he is at the 
receiving end of this economic symbolism. He identifies with the business he works 
for as his ‘identity is the intersection of our everyday lives with the economic and 
political relations of subordination and domination’180. Because it is not static or fixed 
it provides variable opportunities for establishing ‘who we are’. Public discourses, the 
media, advertisement and the organization of production come to present meaning 
and possible identification platforms for the individual. An initial human tendency is to 
make sense of one’s experience, which is considered a universal phenomenon here. 
Hence, in business the entrepreneur is engaged with creating meaningful structures 
and practices and represents a certain position. His role amongst others is to 
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manifest an identity that includes those that identify with the business and excludes 
those who do not.  
 
The overall political landscape in Turkey has changed encouraging a more Islamic 
connotation of Turkish identities that becomes reflected also in local businesses that 
create new identities within these changing circumstances. Business and politics, 
both are spaces for the imagination and realization of new identity. The 
‘transnationalization of economic and cultural life’ 181  makes entrepreneurs like 
Karaduman look at Libya and Egypt for establishing an Islamic attitude towards 
production. The Islamic clothing the fashion brand Tekbir produces is culturally 
targeting those countries whilst receiving support for Islamic identity from them. 
Turkish identity politics claim that Islamic identity has been marginalized and is now a 
‘factor in political mobilization’182 that spreads to the economic realm. Turkish Islamic 
identities have appeal for recuperating moral value within politics and business. 
Although Karaduman’s business is a culture confined to Tekbir, it has significance 
also beyond the company for it attempts to redefine Turkish society and construct a 
new Turkish identity. Tekbir’s identity is ‘reproduced through symbolic systems’183 
like the spiritual business meetings. Driving a Mercedes car and donating a 
proportion of the annual profit for building a local mosque is, anthropologically 
speaking, marking of difference ‘as basis of culture’184. By ordering his business 
according to Islamic principles Karaduman’s business is a meaning structure and a 
cultural system. Similarly Ayaydin’s fashion brand Ipekyol utilizes symbols such as 
mixed-gender roundtable business meetings in a luxurious office environment. For 
him symbols of luxury and wealth are central to his mission of becoming famous. His 
value system is thus much more outward oriented than Karaduman’s is. One could 
say Ayaydin pursues hedonistic identitarian values whereas Karaduman follows 
religious Islamic laws for a morally-integer identity. It is hence to be concluded that 
business is something eminently cultural. It makes a difference to differentiate an 
identity and value system from another and provides meaning structures that appeal 
to human beings. This gives a cultural and social quality to business as it combines 
collectivities based upon ‘culturally accepted practice’185.  
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2.4. The Nature of Identity: A Theoretical Approach 
 
It can be said that economic agency, being an entrepreneur or a worker, provides a 
sense of self. For the purpose of how identities are constructed in general and what 
challenges in particular they are facing today in terms of a globalizing world, Zygmunt 
Bauman, the postmodern theoretician, and his concept of fluid self is relevant for 
understanding the contestation of identities in a changing social and economic 
environment and the inherent instability of values and declining certainty in the 
postmodern world186 . As a brief note on the concept of postmodernism, all that 
should be said here is that it is simply meant to emphasize the cultural condition of 
present-day societies and eschews the ongoing historical debate about whether 
there has been a closure of the modern period or not. The idea of ‘post’ in modernity 
should therefore less be understood as periodizing or historicizing the changes since 
the late 20th century, but rather as a focus on the fragmentations of identities within 
societies. Identity in the context of globalization and as postmodern phenomenon is a 
direct opposition to Western traditional thinking of ‘one version of self’187. Instead 
experience is bound up with selfhood indicating that with new experiences, new 
selves are constructed. Similarly the consumption of pictures, magazines and stories 
affects the mediation of novel experiences and the idea of self. Because the self is a 
rather ambiguous, ‘fluid’ construct as the author is bound to explain, it can adjust to 
these constant inputs and buffer their existential impact. The selected theories of 
fluctuating identities are part of the overall phenomenological perspective to 
accentuate the distinctive elements of radical capitalism.  
 
For Bauman the self is fluidity, a fluctuating entity of multiple selves that change 
according to their environments and experiences steadily188. This postmodern style 
of socio-psychological thinking sees ‘public spaces removed beyond the reaches of 
localized life’189 and replants identity sourcing and construction from the public onto 
the realm of intimate spaces that now produce identities that are global for some, 
whereas some ‘remain fixed in their locality’190. As a consequence identities within 
local spaces differ widely where sources for specific identity can stem from outside 
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the nation-state or the immediate community. A Turkish woman from the wealthy 
Istanbul business elite can ‘afford’ more easily an identity that is a blend of Western 
and Turkish aspects. She can stay single and childless and ‘break’ traditional norms 
of female gender roles. ‘Localities are losing their meaning-generating and meaning-
negotiating capacity’191 and there are niches emerging for alternative identities. For 
instance a female employee at Ipekyol can create a gender identity based upon 
greater equality than if she was to work with Tekbir. She can transport her more 
emancipated role at Ipekyol inside her home and develop new aspirations for herself. 
She may imagine running her own business one day. The potential social 
disapproval of her un-traditional behavior she can come to offset by blending 
traditional aspects of Islamic faith with her newly gained freedom and acceptance at 
work. She represents a new Turkish woman whose deviant lifestyle and aspirations 
are difficult to attack by traditionalists because her identity is a blend or hybrid of old 
and new.  
 
Another model for the illustration of the fluidity of identity is given by Homi Bhabha’s 
conception of ‘third space’192. Third space is ‘contradictory and ambivalent space of 
enunciation […] cultural statements and systems are constructed in’193. The idea of 
enunciation is also central to Stuart Hall’s conception of cultural identity and indicates 
that the ‘I’ is not an entity separate from or independent of its representation194. 
When we speak of, thus enunciate our experiences of our selves, we and our 
represented ‘I’ are never identical Hall says. Instead ‘identity is a production’195 and 
‘discursive’196. The enunciation space is ultimately a position we take towards our 
selves and our surroundings. It is a space in which we interpret our reality and that 
comes to be our identity, at least temporarily. Karaduman claims to know what 
Turkish identity is, and so does Mr. Ayaydin. Both appropriate symbols and translate 
them in their own way because there is no fixed, static truth about what Turkish 
identity is. This means that economic agency comes to be motivated by one’s idea or 
imagination of society, social roles and the world as such. The reader should note 
that this is something rather different from what is stated and theorized by the 
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economic theories and the economists’ self-understanding about their role and 
function within society. They would and will argue that the sole motivation for their 
participation in the global economy is to make money.  
 
All that can be said at this stage is that the self as the reflected ‘I’ is an existential 
category of one’s identity established against an outer world. In other words the self 
is reliant upon the other, an environment or simply something that lies outside of it. It 
also is a construction induced by social, cultural and economic factors. Increasingly 
these factors are ambiguous and fragmented by an array of diverse representations, 
symbols and productions through globalization. The self is therefore an ever-
changing plurality of selves and part of a process of self-reflexivity conditioned by the 
mosaic cultural circuits of globalization.  
 
2.4.1. The Writing of Identity into Globality 
 
As promised in the outset of this chapter, it is necessary to psychologically theorize 
this phenomenon of continuous identity construction. Leon Festinger, a famous 
psychologist of the relationship between identity and cognitive states found that the 
‘mind strives to resolve contradictory states’197 . Contradictions for one’s self are 
numerous in globality where workers from Turkey’s conservative Kayseri region of 
Anatolia must endure that their strictly religious identity conflicts with their behavior 
when they produce sexy fashion for the French Carrefour, for example. Kayseri is the 
exporting sector for many Western fashion brands and many of its workers’ identities 
are strongly centering on traditional religious values. Their psyche experiences 
something what Festinger conceptualizes as ‘cognitive dissonance’198. This means 
that whenever one’s conviction and beliefs contrast with one’s behavior in a particular 
situation, one experiences dissonance. In order to overcome this uncomfortable state, 
the individual attempts to realign his beliefs with his action, for instance by saying ‘I 
am only doing this so I can survive’ or by adding another, new component to the self 
that comes to feel no longer discomfort with the situation199. Somehow the workers of 
Kayseri must adjust or in a postmodern sense relativize their religious principles 
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because they depend on the income paid by their employer who is the French 
Carrefour in this illustration. They must separate their religiously-framed self from 
their working self and de-problematize the dissonant situation by arguing functionally. 
In order to relieve the dissonant state and to legitimize the participation in the 
production of bawdily clothing, the worker can compromise his Muslim self so that he 
for instance accepts culturally-diverse moral systems. He can also split his religious 
from his working self and prefer a pragmatic approach whereby his action is 
legitimate because he and his family depend upon the income that he earns. 
Similarly, Turkish businessmen have resorted to employing women albeit this stands 
in conflict with their traditional religious view on womanhood. Women who work for 
an income outside of the home inevitably become independent from their husbands, 
spend less time at home and may even develop dreams and imaginations that place 
them in typical male roles like becoming a director of their own one day. Depending 
on how strong the imaginary is and how favorable the socio-political environment, 
new identities gradually alter the societal realities when at some future point Muslim 
women in Turkey compete with men not only for social imaginaries but also for real 
positions on the job market. 
 
2.5. A Global Cultural Model  
 
The term ‘global cultural economy’ stems from Appadurai who is one of the first to 
attempt a ‘general theory of global cultural processes’200. His theory conceptualizes 
mental and physical, immaterial and material, ideological and economic transitions 
with focus on the ‘disjunctures’201. His theory is convincing because it does not 
reduce the complexity of global processes that are in constant move and inherently 
‘fractal’202. So far it is established that identity becomes more and more fragmented 
and is a permanently changing entity. It is ‘becoming and being’203 that is future and 
present in one. The past as continuity of self is a narrated myth, a reconstruction. 
The cultural field within which identity is constructed is comprised of social institutions 
such as the family, peer groups and work. They all have an ‘imaginary’204 component 
whereby a self is also a promise, a symbolic aspiration. Identity is individually 
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imagined and realized by relating to new interpretations of identities through media, 
work and technology. Imagination is ‘the infinitely renewable source of desire, 
memory, myth, search and discovery’205. As a result identities are influenced by 
different planes or landscapes as Appadurai calls them. The formation ‘of new 
subjects enables us to discover place from which to speak’206 and is precondition for 
understanding the fluidity of identity illustrated in the second case study.  
 
Appadurai’s landscape model of the five cultural flows accounts for the different 
perspectives and dimensions identity is comprised of. Appadurai’s approach owes to 
‘anthropology and area studies’207 and is limited by his habit of fixating ‘practices, 
spaces, and countries into a map of static differences’208 when referring to constant 
fluctuations. Yet this may be forgiven considering the overall difficulty to theorize 
something as incidental as the cultural flows of globalization. His model investigates 
global cultural processes along five dimensions which are ethnoscapes, 
mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and finally ideoscapes whereby ‘the 
individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes’ 209 . 
Ethnoscapes refer to people trespassing worlds like ‘tourists, immigrants, refugees, 
exiles and guest workers’210  affecting local politics, economics and imaginations. 
Technoscapes are ‘both mechanical and informational’211 and comprise opportunities 
that combine ‘money flows, political possibilities, and the availability of both un- and 
highly skilled labor’212. Financescapes are extremely difficult to pin down as they deal 
with ‘currency markets, national stock exchanges, and commodity speculations’213 . 
Mediascapes refer to the dissemination of information through ‘newspapers, 
magazines, television stations’214  and ‘involve inflections (documentaries) [and a] 
large repertoire of images, narratives, and ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the 
world, in which the world of commodities and the world of news and politics are 
profoundly mixed’ 215 . Global media producing imaginations and ‘starting new 
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conversations’216 by the general transgression of pictures, images, technologies and 
finance flows reach the individual and disturb its traditional self-image. Similarly it is 
‘the image, the imagined, the imaginary [which is] something critical and new in the 
global cultural processes’217  and is to have its rightful place in global theory on 
economic globalization. Lastly ideoscapes ‘have to do with the ideologies of state 
and the counter ideologies of movements’218. Ideoscapes are ‘composed of elements 
of the Enlightenment worldview [and its notions on] freedom, welfare, rights, 
sovereignty, representation, and the master term democracy’219. Similarly ideoscapes 
are the contested site of an ideology that is particularly European, yet makes 
universal claims to economically central notions such as self-interest. Ideoscapes 
have ‘lost the internal coherence’220 due to postmodern critique on the rightfulness of 
a single episteme for the whole world. Ideoscapes are hence really a plurality of 
conceptualizations of worldviews regards culture, identity and sociality. The role of 
ideoscapes, mediascapes and technoscapes will be particularly relevant for 
suggesting a new theory of economic theory.  
 
Appadurai’s model is able of scaffolding the mutual conditionality of these factors on 
identity and the global economy. Overall these landscapes are best imagined as 
spatial meaning formations that change their shapes according to ‘historical, linguistic, 
and political situatedness of different sort of actors: nation-states, multinationals, 
diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether 
religious, political, or economic) […]’221.  
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2.6. The Increasing Role of Identity: Several Paths to Modernity 
 
‘Self-knowledge – always a construction, no matter how much it feels like a discovery – is 
never altogether separable from claims to be known in specific ways by others’222 
 
At this point it is useful to return to the initial question of this chapter, that is how 
identity is important for analyzing economic globalization. Human beings try, and 
always have tried historically, to recuperate a meaning and sense-making structure in 
what they do, their work. Classical economics that has evolved into capitalism has 
over time applied a self-logic by which material means are to replace the former 
meaning-structures of ethics underlying work. However because capitalism is an 
ambiguous ideology that has come to dominate man, it has set off a globally-felt 
identity crisis which is concurrent with postmodernity. Identity is even more critical for 
understanding economic globalization today because it is ‘an escape [from] 
uncertainty’223 and ambiguity. It is of increasing importance to any globality scholar 
because ‘one thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where to belong’224. And 
where people belong, imaginatively, is less and less the nation-state, but an 
individualized community or place. Only when we achieve a recapitulation of what 
capitalism is, namely a meaning structure for man and his identity we can understand 
the role of economics for the Humanities and vice versa.  
 
The increasing exposure to global landscapes, either by the media or foreign 
production sites opens up alternative lives and choices and similarly induces a 
process of reflexivity and self-evaluation in comparison to the other. Because 
globalization brings cultures and identities closer together, it makes Western and 
non-Western societies more conscious of themselves. In the juxtaposition the role of 
identity is central. For the entrepreneur in making strategic decisions abut marketing 
campaigns, research and development, he attempts forecasting the future and 
inevitably interprets the world. For Mustafa Karaduman affirming religious ideals in 
his role as entrepreneur proves that there are alternatives to the secular economic 
rationality model from the West. Similarly this self-consciousness reveals that 
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secularization does not flow ‘naturally from the progress of science and reason’225 
and that the European model is nothing more but a model of modernity. The 
‘pluralism’226 of life styles and identities, the coexistence of scientific and religious 
truths sends troubling message of epistemological uncertainty and ambiguity. The 
question of culture and identity within the global economy is located at the 
‘borderlines of the present’ 227  and signifies the necessity for more global, 
interdisciplinary theories. 
 
‘How are subjects formed in-between’228 and ‘how do strategies of representation or 
empowerment come to be formulated in the competing claims of communities’229 and 
realities? Competing worldviews attempt to ‘bridge home and the world’230 providing 
the stability and illusion of ‘being right’. Identity in this regard is a powerful 
manifestation of a particular ideology as it can challenge assumptions and realities 
that were cemented in an enclosed cultural community before. The ‘contemporary 
compulsion to move beyond’231 is everywhere and analogous to the opening up of in-
between spaces, new social imaginaries. Next to economic sites for identity 
manifestation ‘culture [comes to act] as political struggle’232. For instance when the 
Turkish Prime Minister and his family accept the invitation of Kayseri’s mayor to a 
traditional Islamic wedding, a social act is politicized by the press documenting this 
social event. Gül might have known that anyone who wishes to rule and influence a 
nation’s people and its politics must also, or fist of all, ‘dominate in name of cultural 
supremacy’233. Gül’s sensitivity for the tendency of cultural reorientation in Turkey 
was probably helpful for his electoral victory in 2003 when he was elected Foreign 
Minister of Turkey. His appeal is his combining of Islamic faith and economic 
progress. Gül who becomes Turkey’s President in 2007 is an educated economist 
and religious conservative. He stands for a cultural direction, an ideology that has 
received increasing support from the Turkish population.  
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The geo-political interest the author has in Turkey that hosts Muslim, Christian, 
religious and secular identities, emerges out of the divided nature of Turkey as a 
nation. Being secular by law identity in Turkey, particularly Islamic identity is a central 
topic. A debate on the political connotation of Muslim or religious identity is 
purposefully avoided because all too often it is based upon the essentializing of 
identities ignoring their social constructivist nature. An outcome of this analysis 
should be a debate amongst global theorists and foreign policy makers on the 
viability of the foreshadowed ‘clashes’ of civilizations and cultures. This chapter on 
identity could help in fostering an understanding of difference, detail and complexity 
in the individual’s integration in a globalizing space. Moreover psychological theories 
are preferred to religious studies as the former centers around the individual in a non-
specific, most general sense without having to make cultural speculations.  
 
2.6.1. Limitations to and of Imagination 
 
This section is concerned with outlining potential negative consequences of cultural 
flows for identity and cultural belonging in the global economy. Despite shared 
histories and historically shared meanings, the global cultural economy poses 
questions of belonging and self anew. Images randomly flutter across cultures, 
homes and borders representing alternative lifestyles, cultures and identities. Easily 
they can not only surprise but offend people’s self-understanding and question their 
imagined permanent self 234  meant to be protecting pride and dignity. As a 
consequence affronts against particular identity are taken seriously as if it were a 
matter of life or death. More female Turkish-descent immigrants wear headscarves 
today than they did when they first arrived in Germany in the 1960s. Yet it would be 
foolish to reason that this is only a reaction to the perception of not being respected 
in one’s particularity. On the contrary drawing on the concept of hybridity it can now 
be understood as a particular way of merging female and religious with Turkish-
German identity. The ‘new veiling by the Islamist women alters the social implications 
of the headscarf’235 argues Ilyasoglu. The identity portrayed by wearing the veil today 
should not be equated with the traditional meaning of the headscarf as something 
rural, backwards and of low social status. At the same time public changes of gender 
roles and the economic embrace for female assertiveness and individuality is not 
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carried inside the private homes. The tesettür or the new veiling acts as a symbolic 
divide between the public and the private and permits the women to integrate into the 
public without having to sacrifice private imaginations of their identities.  
 
Identity is social constructivism of complex and negotiated ‘cultural hybridities’236 so 
that it is an individual, personal process. Everybody wants to have a say in how ‘one 
should live’, thus claiming moral and ethical prescriptions for the new space of the 
global cultural economy. As can be derived from the ongoing discussion and analysis, 
aligning one’s self with the global economy is a personal engagement through the 
process of self-reflexivity. That is solutions to the right way of life are increasingly 
found on an individual level. Accordingly the global economy must be characterized 
by ideological messages and cultural meanings attributed to it and inscribed within its 
practices. Yet is everybody equally free to assert a certain identity?  
 
The answer would have to be no. There is a class phenomenon of ‘culturally-
hybrid’ 237  identity. As Bauman argues global identities are inevitably a class 
phenomenon as they are exclusive to the ‘elite sphere’238. It is undoubtedly the case 
that for those with money and familial status a whole array of options surfaces. The 
rich can relocate to a place closer to their imagination. Additionally they have easier 
access to the local political elites so their potential for directly influencing reality is 
higher. They can also resort to a transnational elite class with global connections 
enabling one to live in-between worlds with an in-between identity. One can be a 
hybrid identity in case one has the financial possibilities and social support for it. 
Studying in New York, socializing in Dubai and marrying a covered Muslim woman 
from Kayseri, President Gül’s son perfectly represents such elite identity239. The 
class privilege for identity is also refuge for one’s hybrid identity that is so different to 
the ordinary socio-political and cultural realities. It postulates a sort of meta-space 
that satisfies ideals of lifestyles whilst it protects the unusual demands of such an 
identity. It is obvious that compared to a factory worker an entrepreneur or the 
President’s son has significantly higher potential to express and realize his or her 
imagination of identity. But the cultural, economic and political landscapes are first of 
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all immaterial stimulations for reflexivity and differentiation. Products, ideas, news 
and images reach also the factory worker stirring up his or her understanding of self 
and reality. The commencing process of self-reflexivity is real for all, except that for 
many it will remain a dream to reconfigure one’s identity in light of revised aspects of 
self. The case study on Arabian television will demonstrate how everyone has at 
least the opportunity to think one’s self across classes and socio-political realities.  
 
Another limitation to the freedom of imagining a self anew is the fear of instability of 
selfhood. It means that the process of self-reflexivity is cut short due to the feared 
ambiguity and loss of certainty the postmodern, global world embodies. Mamdani 
argues that once globalization is perceived as eroding locality and culture it is 
perceived as destructive force whereby unique identities are washed into a stream of 
standardization and de-individuation fused into a global network of consumption240. 
The fear of losing one’s distinctiveness makes the availability of the other and his 
ideas intimidating, not liberating. In this case the individual seeks refuge in the 
promises of stability by religious rules. In order to maintain one’s ‘dignity and pride’241, 
religiosity receives greater recognition for it interprets the purpose of life and identity 
for the individual, usually by discrediting new, alternative sources for identity 
formation. Considering Regina Polak, a scholar of pastoral theory, the power of 
traditional sources of self like religion is appealing to many242. She is convinced like 
so many other religious scholars that technological and economic changes alone do 
not suffice to master the global challenges. Only a ‘spiritual or religious 
rootedness’243 provides the necessary strength and persistence for a stable, future 
orientation. In fact throughout human history ‘religion [played] a crucial role in man’s 
search for meaning and self-esteem’244. Due to its ‘integrative function in the complex 
ego structure [of self]’245, it may release identity from the discomforting postmodern 
ambiguity and coexisting, competing meaning structures, however at the expense of 
asserting a new, self-reflected identity. 
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The ‘totalitarian extension of the logic [of global financial markets] on all aspects of 
life’ 246  disintegrates worldviews in the light of relativizing forces of sources of 
production, ideas, meaning and identity causing emotions to run high. The role of 
imagination performs a liberating, synthesizing role, yet not without limitations. 
Blurring boundaries, disturbing people’s self-understanding as well as relativizing 
cultural standards is offering opportunities and represents risks at the same time. 
This will be laid out in the following case study. 
 
2.6.2. Case Study Two:  
 The Production of Ideologies of Identities 
 
This second case study on Arabian television will substantiate the role of imagination 
and the aspect of fluidity in the construction of ideologies of identities in the global 
cultural economy. The amalgamation of images and information about the other, the 
stranger, is opening up new spaces for self-image. The other and his alternative 
worldviews are no longer marked-off by territorial gates, but seize new territory and 
minds from within; constantly and permanently. The siege of flowing ideas and 
plangent knowledge cannot be halted by ordinary means as no army is large enough 
for guarding against the permeability of fiber-optic cables, digital news and virtual 
space. The other as the stranger representing alternatives and viciously questioning 
one’s eternality and stability of self has already occupied the lands and minds of all. 
No one can abscond from this new reality of relativizing one’s existential philosophy 
of meaning by the media and its various images of selves.  
 
‘The introduction of satellite television in the Middle East in the early 1990s’247 has 
brought alternatives for identities into the majority of homes whereby ‘the number of 
satellite channels has tripled since 2004, and, today, the majority of households in 
the region have satellite TV’248. ‘The top ten channels, which reach an estimated 90 
percent of Arab homes [facilitate] the creation of new forums [that are] cross-regional 
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[and establish] a virtual on-air community’249. Returning to Appadurai’s landscape 
model the case study exemplifies the mutual influencing of media- and ideoscapes. 
That is because the production and broadcasting of new imaginations of female 
selves for instance fosters or undermines current ideologies and identities. 
Mediascapes have ideological valence because they encourage thinking a new self 
and provoke the ‘old’ ideology of values and self. Together they can cause the 
disjunctures and differences Appadurai holds as characteristic of the global cultural 
economy250.  
 
The Wide Angle production called ‘Dishing democracy’ 251  that aired in 2007 
demonstrates the way how self-image is targeted by media images. The Arabian talk 
show, Kalam Nawaem or ‘The sweet talk’ 252  discusses taboo topics such as 
homosexuality and infidelity confronting Muslim women’s and men’s cultural self-
understanding. The documentary is structured in five parts: ‘Kalam Nawaem’, ‘A 
media revolution’, ‘Raniah and Farah’, ‘Breaking Taboos’, and ‘Muna and Fawzia’. It 
is over 51 minutes long and depicts the transformation of the Arab world by a single 
media show253. The show is looking at social issues from a woman’s perspective, yet 
has a large proportion of male viewers as well. The hosts of the show come from four 
different countries; Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Egypt. One of the four TV 
hosts has been living in England and her identity hosts aspects of English and 
Lebanese culture. All four have come to establish a new Muslim female identity for 
themselves, one that harmonizes having a career and being a devout Muslim, which 
is causing other women to rethink their identities. The TV host Farah, originally from 
Palestine, has never left the ‘East’ but has come to establish a self that contradicts 
traditional norms and benefits from the mediascapes as a platform to confirm her 
identity as well as to communicate a new possibility to others. The program runs 
weekly on Sunday evenings and is 60 minutes long. It airs since 2002 with about 300 
million Arabic speaking viewers from Europe, America, Africa, and the Arab world. 
Ideas of womanhood and identity are translated into the Arab context with the 
satellite television as a means for its coming to life. One of the hosts states that the 
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‘program [is] for the mass, not the elite’254, which due to its trans-territorial reach 
bypasses ‘control and censorship by the governments’255 . Satellite TV is a truly 
independent, transnational media form that instigates public discourse on identity, 
religion and culture.  
 
Unlike the Arab world that considers itself ‘traditional, moral, and ethical [due to its] 
common value system [that is] resistant to change’256, mediascapes and ideoscapes 
challenge any acclaimed eternity and permanence of values, ideas and identities. 
The female hosts discuss ‘what does it mean to be a Muslim’ and a woman, for 
example257. Now it seems there are several ways to be a Muslim woman, some of 
which combine modernity and tradition. The new presented variety of Muslim female 
identity is an enunciation space for women. The TV show explores a whole spectrum 
of Muslim identity and sets new examples for family, fatherhood and womanhood. 
Only one of the four TV hosts wears the veil and her opinion on the discussed taboo 
topics is especially interesting for the more conservative viewers. But her progressive, 
‘non-traditional’ stance signals that the veiling of the modern Muslim woman can only 
be interpreted by the woman herself.  
 
To sum up, for capitalism as cultural system the media landscapes are an important 
dimension because social conception of local reality is increasingly deterritorial and 
sometimes virtual as in the case of the trans-Arabic TV show.  
 
2.7. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has revealed that the ‘shapes of cultures are less bounded’258 and 
subject to changes that are conventionally labeled ‘postmodern’. The section on 
identity construction demonstrates how ideology is intractably bound up with identity 
re-construction in the environment of random, volatile and diverse cultural flows. 
These flows are theorized by Appadurai as landscapes that shape identity formation, 
yet in rather personal, intimate ways259. As a result TV shows like Kalam Nawaem 
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produce new, hybrid identities that can be expected to create new, non-Western 
paths to cultural and economic integration into the world-system.  
 
The author has referred to psychological theories of cognitive dissonance in order to 
capture the arising internal contradictions and strategies for managing identity and 
constructing realities in the global economy. Psychological theories and postmodern 
concepts of identity were referenced in order to offer a scaffolding of identity in 
temporality and spatiality of globalization. It was derived that cultural aspects of 
techno-, ideo-, and mediascapes are leading to identity reformulations and self-
reflexivity. Once identity is imagined and newly thought it comes to be affirmed 
through processes at work as suggested by the first case study. With new ideas, 
economic opportunities and changing self-concepts former identities become 
questioned. The same process of self-reflexivity has various outcomes across space 
as globalization as a fluctuation of networks that are economic, historical, cultural and 
political means there is ‘something very different taking place in many parts of the 
world’260. Economic globalization is a ‘social transformation’261 that necessitates a 
broader framework than the narrow economic outlook taken by most political 
economists and economic sociologists. Our knowledge and conception of identity 
must be revised in order to understand its fluidity seeking constant re-affirmation. The 
process of reaffirming a self can be via religious means. Yet in any way does it come 
to be reflected in how one approaches work. This turns work into a central site for 
identity where especially in the context of the global economy, alternative identities 
and ideologies challenge one’s self persistently.  
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3.1. Disorientation as a Global Sentiment 
 
Global capitalism is confrontational and radical by nature producing social and 
cultural unforeseen negative consequences. The transformed capitalism has 
alienated man from work as a meaning structure and his own identity. Historically the 
concept of self-interest was an ethically restricted motivation for economic behavior. 
So far a global value system is absent and money on its own does not provide a 
sufficiently meaningful structure because it follows a narrow self-logic of economic 
rationality. The reason for the persistence of the current amoral system and its 
continuous clashes abroad are due to its meaning for identity for the economically 
dominating West. ‘Western rationalism preserves the boundaries of the sense for 
itself’262, which explains how the concept of secular rationality has become identity 
for the West. It further illuminates why it is so vehemently defended abroad. Yet a 
sense of self based upon secular rationality do not shelter a nation or region from the 
intruding ‘landscapes’263 of globalization that shake foundations of knowledge just to 
reclaim truth as something that is plural. How the second case study demonstrated 
satellite TV reaches the majority of homes challenging the dominant structures and 
aspects of a culture. Bauman puts the very nature of globalization in a nutshell when 
he says that ‘globalization is not about what we all […] wish or hope to do - It is about 
what is happening to us all’264. Those effects impact on locality and cultural identity 
causing ‘the growing experience of weakness, indeed of impotence, of the habitual, 
taken-for-granted ordering agencies’ 265  like the nation-state. The forces of 
globalization are self-perpetuating, anarchic and uncontrolled causing feelings of 
disorientation.  
 
The radical global capitalism functions now according to self-logic that is foreign to 
the social, cultural and ethical imbeddedness of economics. The limitation to 
economics by a moral sense safeguarding human dignity evaporates in thin air. 
Money cannot replace meaning and morale because it has never been a ‘place of 
pride’266 since ancient human history. The generalization of a crisis instigated by 
global capitalism ubiquitously appears to stem from the failure of turning money into 
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a global value system. The grand, Eurocentric ‘narrative of modernity and the values 
of progress’267 must be reconsidered and removed from its ‘narcissm of modernity’268. 
The modern concept of rationality has become a ‘cultural condition for the West’269 
and explains social, economic, and political phenomena invariably. This ‘synchronic 
essentialism’270  is a chronic condition for the West. But due to the ambiguity of 
modernity, there is an unleashing struggle over value reorientation. The looming 
disorientation is a global sentiment with existential depth. The ‘contest for political 
and social authority within the modern world order’271 leads to the recent resurgence 
of conservative religious ideals in officially secular places like Turkey.  
 
3.2. The Ethical Nature of Self-interest as Limit to the Free 
Market  
 
Obviously ‘the moral leadership of the secular state’272 and the assumption of a 
single epistemological framework with universal validity is questionable and to be 
abandoned. The concept of ethics is taken synonymous with morality whereas both 
are concerned with the proper way of conduct of man in a certain context. Due to the 
real interdependence of cultural factors and the economic realm the shortcomings of 
the global economy today are as it seems, direct outcomes of its own misconception 
as universal, amoral functionality of human behavior. For it lacks ‘clear ideological or 
moral standards’273  and is culturally dogmatic, it tends to ‘sacralize’ money and 
materialistic self-interest. The direct confrontations of identities and their ideologies in 
‘economic and cultural globalization’274 have become instrumentalized by terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda as ‘a tacit support for their terrorist acts’275. Although the role of 
terrorism will not be evaluated here, it serves as example of the violence and hatred 
a perceived threat to one’s self can create. The assumed cultural superiority by the 
West is overcome by the increasing resistances and shortcomings of the Western-
dominated world-system. Since Western modernity no longer corresponds to higher 
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standards of civility, values and morals, there is a ‘loss of faith in the ideological form 
of that culture and its socio-cultural project of secular nationalism’276. ‘Greed in the 
service of reason was to be the driving force of the economy’277 and is a particular 
characteristic of the moral inadequacy of European materialist expansionism. 
European modernity moved from an ethical orientation of self-interest to becoming an 
egocentric, materialistic motivation that meets repulsion from inside and outside 
Europe. Secularization and privatization have produced neo-liberal ideals that are 
perceived as image of crisis instead of as a symbol of success and progress. The 
legitimization of unrestrained self-interest and the rationalization of faith have 
resulted in social shortcomings that have called for the reorientation to an ‘ethical and 
practical’278 foundation for the economy.  
 
Bourdieu, the famous French sociologist, views the social dimension of economics 
merely as an economic metaphor that overarches the social framework whereby 
economic interests expand to non-economic goods like culture and gender roles279. 
He comes to the conclusion that the economic and social realm then is 
quintessentially the same. For him the ‘struggle over material and symbolic 
resources’280  are all based upon the very same motivation; namely self-interest. 
Undoubtedly self-interest can be seen as the central motivation for human agency, 
but it is argued here that it is an ethical category. For capitalism in-itself lacks ‘clear 
ideological or moral standards’281 it is therefore by nature contingent upon a sense-
making structure outside of it, which is an ethical understanding of self-interest. 
Economic globalization entails the ‘distancing of economics from ethics that has 
occurred with the development of modern economics’282 states Amartya Sen, an 
economist and philosopher who was awarded the Nobel Prize of economics in 1998. 
If one is to conceptualize self-interest as an ethical concept for motivating economic 
behavior, then the economic is a social sphere where economic interests are side by 
side with non-economic motivations. Hence, on these grounds Bourdieu’s statement 
must be rejected.  
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Since the 1960s ‘non-religious ethics’283 have been systematically investigated. In the 
West ethics has come to be seen as standing ‘at odds with self-interest’284, which has 
been depicted in the historical outline of capitalism. The philosopher of ethics Peter 
Singer states that ‘the same assumption of the conflict between ethics and self-
interest lies at the root of much modern economics’285. He states that an ethical life 
can be defined as ‘[identifying] ourselves with the other, and larger goals, thereby 
giving meaning to our lives’ 286 . In other words one’s pure dedication to profit 
maximization misses to describe man’s natural tendency seeking something beyond 
himself and above immediate reality. The reductionist interpretation of self-interest in 
economics is implausible because it is exclusively ‘materialist’287. It says that an 
entrepreneur is led by ‘greed […] and has no sense of the common good’288. As the 
radical type of capitalism in the West is ‘without serious rivals anywhere in the 
world’289, it promotes an ethically degenerated attitude to money-making. It can be 
concluded that it is not a ‘characteristic mentality associated with the market’290, but 
that the market produces a certain mentality. Albeit this mentality is heavily contested 
and alternative mentalities coexist. For the Islamic world the radicalization and 
rationalization of self-interest according to purely materialist measures, poses direct 
threat to integrity, cultural autonomy and self. The social domain is hence not to be 
satisfied by economic means only. Neither can economic rules provide satisfactory 
results for matters on culture, identity and meaning. The author does not agree with 
Bourdieu on conflating economic and social domains in regard to their foundation in 
self-interest. Instead it is argued that Bourdieu defined self-interest essentially as a 
non-ethical concept and functionalized it conflating value and function similar to Max 
Weber. However a functional account is not automatically a valuable one. And self-
interest as an ethical notion is valuable it restrains the anarchic market forces. 
Another famous thinker of self-interest is Adam Smith who is usually mistaken as the 
inventor of the free market paradigm based upon the invisible hand and functional 
self-interest. Then we would have to revise our current perception of the free market 
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and recognize the contingency of self-interest on the moral sense Smith called 
sympathy291. Sympathy as a capacity to feel what someone else is feeling without 
reference to one’s self underlies all human relations, also the economic ones292. This 
would mean that given the moral capacity of sympathy the free market is constrained 
by one’s sympathy for the other. The market does not work by following one’s own 
desires only, but by acknowledging the other’s dignity and identity. The self and the 
moral sense are bound up with the economy. Smith unlike Mandeville in his Fable of 
the Bees did not agree that ‘[only] fools strive to make a great honest hive’293, but 
that virtues and wisdom are more respectable than wealth and power.  
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4.1. What is Cultural About the Economy? 
 
‘It is not our human nature that is universal, but our capacity to create cultural realities, 
and then to act in terms of them’294 
 
After having established the relationship between economic theory, ethics and 
identity it is concluded that man seeks to synthesize a meaning structure that is 
cultural. Culture was used as a broad term covering identity, religion, and tradition to 
make sense of subjective experiences and to meaningfully interpret them. The case 
study on Turkey has shown how religion and identity as cultural factors of economics 
come to play a role for the way business is conducted and legitimized, namely along 
Islamic ethics. The second case study on the Arab TV show exemplified the role self-
image plays for the cultural system of capitalism as shaper of the ideologies of 
identities. Albeit the social dimensions of the structural inequalities of the global 
economy are mentioned occasionally, the focus is put on the cultural factors that are 
concerned with the subjectivities of experiences in economic globalization.  
 
At this point Turkey’s geopolitical landscape is analyzed in order to examine the 
political instrumentalization of identity for Turkey’s economic integration into the 
world-system. Turkey is an extremely interesting socio-cultural region as it is 
geographically connecting Orient and Occident. For some general facts about Turkey 
please view Appendix two. Politically Turkey is secular by law and has no state 
religion. Yet the country is quite religious where 99.8 percent of the Turkish 
population is Muslim believing in Allah295. In 2001 30.4 percent ‘agree strongly [that] 
people who don’t believe in God are unfit for public office’296 contradicting somewhat 
the country’s official position towards religion. In the same year, 33.5 percent ‘totally 
agree that it is better if people with strong religious belief are in public office’297.  
 
It is said that since the 1970s an Islamic rise has taken place in Turkey dividing the 
country over its secular, Kemalist historical foundation. For the first time in history 
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Turkey’s business elite is situating itself somewhat in-between the Islamic AK Party 
and the secular, nationalist parties. Identity is definitely an issue for the business elite 
for which the ‘pluralistic, secular community’298 is not Turkish enough. Karaduman 
from Tekbir is one such entrepreneur who idealizes cultural traditionality and 
imagines Turkish identity to be Islamic emphasizing brotherhood and community over 
the alienating and individuating forces of global capitalism299. Certainly religion and 
identity play a significant role for Turkish capitalism. As an overarching moral 
structure Islamic economics allows for prayers during work and legitimizes material 
accumulation by subordinating economic profits to serving religious principles like 
financing the building of a mosque. Also on the political level the ideology of Turkish 
identity increasingly blends ‘Islamic values’300 with capitalism. Economics must hence 
cease to be seen as being imperatively secular and renounce its exclusively 
materialistic notion of self-interest. Cultural identity and economic reality condition 
each other whereby culture is part of economic agency and capitalism is a cultural 
system of economics. Furthermore the re-capitulation of the nature of economics as 
something cultural sheds new light on recent religious revival movements in the world. 
It improves our understanding of those movements as something potentially 
constructive when it is seeking alternatives for combining faith and wealth.  
 
In order to understand the centrality of identity in the global economy one must look 
at money301. This is so because making money requires active participation in the 
global economy by which one is establishing a unique identity against another as 
‘human social forms are […] characterized by drawing boundaries’302. On the course 
of making money an entrepreneur must decide why he is in the business and how he 
is managing it, in short what his motivations and underlying principles are. An 
entrepreneur communicates a perspective and an identity when working with a 
variety of cultures that leads to enhanced self-awareness and self-reflexivity. 
Different identities and meaning structures underlie and support entrepreneurial 
activity so that the identity of the Turkish economy must differ from that of Germany, 
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for example. Material accumulation and the ambition for wealth have been historically 
dependent on moral justification indicating that the economic sphere in general 
implies moral structures. Morality is a human capacity as Adam Smith would say and 
the outcome of interpreting man’s relation with the outside world. As such it is an 
integral part of culture. The analysis of the case studies and the literature supports 
the hypothesis that capitalism is a cultural system that necessitates a moral meaning 
structure, which is influenced by the transmission of images and discourses about 
alternative values and identities. This necessity does not arise from an ideology of 
social capitalism, but is due to a natural need of human beings to give meaning to 
their actions.  
 
4.2. The Moral Nature of Economics  
 
Economic theories have become deprived of moral perspectives and ethical 
restraints to making profit. Furthermore neo-liberal theory or radical global capitalism 
simply degenerated into a self-serving, dogmatic functional account with an internal 
logic and universal embrace. Completely cut off from the socio-cultural domain it 
cannot explain the global resistances refuting its detrimental socio-cultural effects. 
Boulding views the problem with neo-liberalism in that it regards economics as a 
universal set of rules for which morals and ethics have no value303. He defines 
morals as a ‘question of a hierarchy of preference between alternatives’304, thus an 
ordering instrument that patterns actions according to their intrinsic worth for the 
individual’s place in life, in other words its identity. It is concluded that identity is the 
result of one’s moral justification of self-interest and a central component of 
economics.  
 
The way an entrepreneur comes to view his mission in business is also a moral 
decision, a preference for certain actions over others. He might prefer employing 
skilled female workers over hiring males from abroad because he views it more 
ethically correct to employ nationals, for example. But because economics and 
morals today are seen as in opposition, there is no model thus far that can 
                                                 
303
 Kenneth, E. Boulding. Ökonomie als eine Moralwissenschaft, in: Seminar: Poltische Ökonomie: Zur 
Kritik der herrschenden Nationalökonomie, ed. Winfried Vogt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Taschenbuch 1973).  
304
 Boulding, Ökonomie als Moralwissenschaft, 103. 
4 Recovering a Moral Dimension of the Global Economy 68 
adequately describe and evaluate the various normative and moral elements in 
business305. As the economy is about ‘two life goods: the pursuit of happiness and 
benevolence’306, it has very different meaning for different people. The nature of 
economics is thus about interpreting happiness and benevolence according to one’s 
culture. Thus it can come to have religious aspects. In conclusion, economic 
decisions are not only based upon utility maximization, but on one’s ‘personality 
structure’307 and preference for certain values and identities.  
 
4.3. Turkey’s Islamic Orientation: Identities Contested 
 
‘The only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for 
us by our religion, our history and our civilization‘308 
 
There is a rising importance of identity in economic globalization because when 
economic power reflects cultural perspectives and ideologies, then the way in which 
identity is incorporated into economic agency has the potential to shift societal and 
political structures. The theoretical shortcomings of modern economic theory have 
politicized the global economy where different ideologies and cultural identities strive 
to ‘cannibalize one another’309. They have instigated a political discourse on the 
nature of Turkish identity and Turkey’s ‘right’ way of integrating into the global 
economy in order to reflect its cultural power. This section will describe the cultural 
imagination of Turkish identity by the political parties. 
 
‘Externally similar forms of economic organization are compatible with very different 
economic ethics’310 states Weber. This similarly implies that ‘morality of one type of 
society is not appropriate to a society of a different type [as] there are no moral ideals 
which can claim universal validity’311. In order to enhance the understanding of the 
specificity of Turkish identity and Turkish morals, it is important to examine Turkey’s 
political economy to comprehend the relationship between political leadership, 
Islamic orientation and economic evolution. In combination with religious 
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manifestations of identities, Turkish politics tries to influence the meaning structure 
relevant for the economic outlook of the country. Political interpretation of Turkish 
identity is meant to define the path for Turkey’s integration into the world-system. 
What is the official Turkish reaction to the influx of foreign products, production 
patterns, images and ideologies? How do political parties resolve the balance 
between economic integration and socio-cultural differentiation? When taking a 
closer look at Turkish politics one can see how it comes to act as normative and 
moral leadership for the economy.  
 
Öncü argues the ‘Islamization’ of places like Turkey is ‘to prepare for the other 
world’312 that makes universalistic claims about the foundations of the economy in 
terms of the nature of rationality and self-interest. As we know Weber’s cultural 
sensitivity towards the plurality of economic systems based upon different cultures 
fell short of adjusting his terminology of rationality to other cultures. Rationality in 
Turkish culture is bound up with the religious dedication to a ‘higher purpose’313 for 
the economy. The other world is the dominant West that is accused of moralizing its 
materialist notion of economic principles wishing to homogenize economic cultures. 
The perceived threat of indifference to cultural particularity and identity makes the 
discourse on identity and the establishment of unique cultural economic identity 
central to the political and economic sphere. The Turkish President of 2007 Abdullah 
Gül who was raised in the religiously-conservative region of Kayseri, is convinced 
that Turkey just like the United States is able to advance economically whilst 
remaining religiously-devoted 314 . How are economic changes within the country 
influenced by politics of identity?  
 
The military defeat of 1683 in Vienna, had led the Ottoman Empire to look at the 
West and adopt its military and administrative organization. In the 1920s the 
Republic’s founder Kemal Atatürk carried them further when he abolished the old 
Islamic institutions like ‘the caliphate to the Islamic courts’315. He also refused to 
make Islam Turkey’s state religion in 1928 so that at least constitutionally Turkey’s 
worldview was not religiously framed. Instead he modeled the Turkish state along 
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European, especially French institutions like the military and the educational system. 
As early as 1950 Turkey’s major party, the Kemalist Republican Peoples Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP)316 was defeated by the Democrat Party. A military 
coup in the 1960s however dissolved the Democrat Party (AP) due to bad leadership, 
which had led to economic stagnation and democratic deficits. Since the 1960s 
Turkish identity is increasingly religiously-cast turning towards a ‘stronger Turkish 
identification with Islam’317. The MNP, the Milli Nizam Partisi, or National Order Party 
is an Islamic opposition and the ‘first political representation of political Islam in 
Turkey’318. After being outlawed by the state and after the second military coup of 
1971, the MSP, Milli Selamat Partisi or National Salvation Party is established as 
successor of the MNP and becomes the third biggest party in the parliament by 1973. 
The period of the 1970s marks the Islamic uprising in Turkey. The MSP’s strength 
lies in its presentation of an economic alternative to the import-substitution strategy 
(ISI) that has been a state promoted development program since the 1960s. ISI as a 
strategy for industrialization restricts the amount of imports in order to stimulate local 
industries for exports and national consumption. ISI had become especially 
unpopular with the rural population that had no direct benefits from the urbanization 
of the country and its city-centered export zones. But even for the urban local centers 
ISI in the context of the international work division generally fails to deliver the 
desired outcomes for industrial development. In fact the local industrial zone is 
generally subordinated to the world-system’s core’s economic agenda and its 
necessity for off-shore mass production facilities requiring cheap, unskilled and 
abundant labor that is holding local industries back from sophisticating and upgrading 
their production range.  
 
Central to the uneven economic modernization in the course of ISI was the TOBB, a 
chamber for commercial matters that originated in 1952 with the initial goal to 
represent the interests of the private sector as well as broader society319. Yet it 
excluded the Anatolian manufacturers from critical decision-making processes about 
the socio-cultural and economic structural changes of the industrialization program. 
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The influence of the TOBB dramatically increased with the first five year plan, a state-
led economic structural program in 1963. From 1962 until 1976 the Turkish economy 
expanded by 6.6 percent yearly320. At that time the TOBB served more and more the 
interests of the private-sector industries and overlooked the small farmers. It 
distributed import quotas in the favor of the industry and took a unilateral stance as 
economic decision-making power within Turkey neglecting the agricultural and trade 
segments, which were the traditional and historical pillars of the Turkish economy. 
Hence it was the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) situated in Turkey’s 
rural regions like Anatolia that feel disadvantaged and overlooked by the ISI program. 
They perceived the state’s industrialization program favoring the cosmopolitan 
industries from Istanbul and Izmir at the expense of the traditional craftsmanship of 
the periphery321. With the economic transformation, traditional agricultural sectors 
declined or became superfluous. Similarly impetuous societal changes occurred due 
to labor migration, urbanization and the new division of labor tailored to the 
industrialization of the economy. Society reconfigured along a ‘corporate system’322 
that represented the various interest groups of the new economy and diffused 
traditional Turkish identity that used to be based on the nation’s agricultural sector.  
 
With industrialization Turkey becomes a nodal point of the global economy opening 
up new opportunities as well as challenges to traditional identity and the rural 
economy. Until the late 1960s the SMEs have practically ‘no influence on the […] 
industrial politics of their country’323. It is in the early 1970s when those previously 
neglected traders and craftsmen find political representation in the MSP324. Under 
Necmettin Erbakan, the political leading figure of the conservative MSP, the 
corporate structures of the TOBB are dissolved and the unheard voices from Anatolia 
and other Turkish peripheries become politicized. The MSP suggests an alternative 
path of economic development that is less focused on the global market, and more 
attuned to the reallocation of resources and profits within Turkey preserving Turkish 
identity. 
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The MSP’s interpretation of economic globalization says that ‘the world [is] within the 
framework of the cultural and economic imperialism of the West’325 . Due to the 
economic value and perceived responsibility to defend traditional identity, the party 
promotes instead a ‘third way’ 326  to enable ‘independent’ 327  and Turkish 
industrialization. The party’s goal is to find an alternative way to economic integration 
whilst preserving and differentiating Turkish identity. The third way is an intriguing 
blend of Turkish values with economic global principles. By depicting the West as a 
system in decay reflected in the privatization of public services, increasing income 
disparity and urban poverty political rhetoric functions to alienate the Turkish 
population from the world-system and to discourage imitation of Western values and 
principles. As alternative and safeguard from moral vacuity and loss of identity, Islam 
is presented as the third way allowing modernization of the economy whilst 
maintaining traditional, cultural values. The logic of the MSP in the 1970s is to 
consider a return to Islamic values a necessary companion of Turkish economic 
modernization. Atac reasons that by drawing onto religion as a factor for establishing 
a modern, just society based upon a healthy economy the MSP is able to 
‘instrumentalize religion as a unifying element […]’328. By brand-marking economic 
globalization as a cultural hegemonic project, the party is able to mobilize people to 
strengthen the Islamic face of Turkish cultural identity that appears as the clearest 
and possibly strongest delineation from Western economic culture. In this sense, 
Turkey’s cultural integration into the world economy becomes pivotal for political 
ideology.  
 
However the MSP’s opposition to the radical left in a coalition government of the 
1970s causes societal fragmentation and anarchy which is counteracted by another 
military coup in 1980329 . After the coup Turgut Özal, leader of the conservative 
Motherland Party (ANAP) is first Prime Minister330. Inspired by American Mormons, 
he and his brother envision material wealth to be supported by a ‘strong religious 
faith’331. Also Erbakan launches a new party after the military had banned all the 
previous ones. His Welfare Party, Refah Partisi, at first is rather unsuccessful and 
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until 1987 unable to enter parliament. But finally the party wins 17 percent of the 
national vote in 1991. Only four years later in 1995 the party wins 158 out of 500 
parliamentary seats 332  and Erbakan becomes Prime Minister in a coalition 
government. Erbakan suggests a re-orientation to the ‘Islamic and Ottoman 
empire’333, a time when the region had enjoyed cultural and economic dominance 
over the West until its defeat in Vienna. New to this politicization of history is the 
emphasis upon a moral framework that is to accompany the indigenous 
industrialization project334 . Importantly the Welfare Party prioritizes religious over 
national identity and takes over much of the political territory formerly occupied by the 
secular Turkish left. Erbakan’s ‘Islamic-led government of 1997’335 is annulled by the 
military and fragments the Islamic movement of the time. A fraction of the Welfare 
Party comes to form the AK Party discussed subsequently.  
 
Generally the moralizing of politics that seeks to leverage on the cultural aspect of 
economics keeps resurfacing in Turkey to this day whereby the Islamic parties clash 
with the other, ‘secular, Kemalist, and nationalist parties’336. This is apparent in the 
present-day political landscape of Turkey. The oldest political party is the 
Republican’s People’s Party (CHP) which has close ties to the army and state 
bureaucracy receiving 20.88 percent in the 2007 elections. The CHP and the 
Nationalist Movement Party, MHP, led by Devlet Bahceli form the opposition to the 
AKP. The CHP is a ‘platform that combines vicious hostility to Turkey’s Kurdish 
minority [and supports] an invasion of northern Iraq by the Turkish army’337 next to 
promising ‘social improvements’338 . All other political parties fail to pass the 10 
percent threshold to enter parliament, so that the AKP, the CHP and the MHP can be 
considered the main Turkish parties today. Nonetheless ‘27 independent candidates 
take up seats in the new parliament [whereby 24 come from the] pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (DTP)’339.  
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Finally this glimpse at Turkey’s political economy clarfiifes that the attitude of the 
Turkish farmers and small entrepreneurs from the periphery is intelligible not as anti-
globalist per se, but as reaction to the ‘complex, overlapping, disjunctive […]’340 
forces a global economic model implies where social practices, ideologies, cultural 
identities and economic opportunities are intermixed in a chaotic fashion341. It can be 
said that economics is a form of negotiation between sites of agency, individuals, and 
globally defined fields of possibility’342.  
 
4.3.1. Turkeys’ New Face of Islam 
 
A ‘modernist faction of younger Islamist activists, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and 
Abdullah Gül’ 343  surfaces with yet another particularity of the Turkish political 
economy in the early 21st century. The two leaders favor economic integration with 
the world-system over ‘international Muslim solidarity’344. They come to form their 
own party, the AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Islamic Justice and Development 
Party in 2002. The AKP, a ‘religion-based movement’ 345  instrumentalizes this 
kaleidoscope of intersections and reflections of identity and economic modernization. 
It also frames the global economy as a Western hegemonic project but does not 
disapprove of cooperating with the West as long as Turkey has established a strong 
and culturally unique sense of self to prevent a further ‘Westernization’ of Turkey’346.  
 
Erdogan represents a new face of Islam that is congruent with secular state 
structures whilst being publicly religious. He interprets secularism in a novel way that 
harmonizes public religiosity like wearing the veil, banning alcohol from municipal 
buildings and reciting religious poems with his serious dedication to political and 
economic liberalism. His ideology of liberalism Erdogan calls 'American-style 
laiklik’347 which encourages public expression of religious beliefs. Currently wearing 
the headscarf at University is prohibited by Turkish law, a democratic deficit and 
                                                 
340
 Appadurai, Modernity, 32. 
341
 Appadurai, Modernity. 
342
 Appadurai, Difference in global economy.  
343
 Carroll, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. 
344
 Carroll, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. 
345
 Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey, vii. 
346
 Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 156. 
347
 Carroll, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. 
4 Recovering a Moral Dimension of the Global Economy 75 
‘illiberal repression of Islam’ 348  for Erdogan. He rather sends his daughters to 
University in America, where they are free to wear the headscarf. Despite his 
religious conservatism, Erdogan has an economically progressive outlook. It is in a 
sense ironical that in modern Turkey it is the Islamists who pursue avidly the 
modernization of the country and introduce ‘Western-style reforms’ 349 . This 
development however becomes more comprehensible in face of the ‘basic 
deficiency’ Turks experienced by the ‘top-down, cultural restructuring’350 Kemalism 
imposed onto Turkey since the 1920s. In 1925 Atatürk imposed the ‘Hat law’351 that 
forbid the ‘traditional turban or fez’ 352  introducing Western style clothing for 
‘appropriate’ public appearance. The force with which Atatürk conducted his reforms 
for a new, ‘modern’ Turkish identity had caused resistance towards the ‘total and 
slavish imitation of a model […]’ 353 . Most important of all is that the desired 
establishment of a new Turkish identity and the attempt to leave the Ottoman past 
behind by imitating the West was backfiring because the Western model is ultimately 
one that emphasizes Western identity and cultural values reflected in its economic 
culture. It becomes much clearer now why a party like the AKP represents both, 
unique Turkish economic culture and integration into the world-system that is 
appealing to the Turkish population. In the end a Turkish nation that is secure of its 
identity is less fearful to approach the other world, which explains why the AKP aims 
at Turkey’s economic integration into the world-system.  
 
Returning to the initial question of this chapter then, political parties resolve the 
balance between economic integration and cultural differentiation through the 
Islamization that is the politicization of Turkish identities. As a study by TESEV, a 
Turkish NGO shows there has been a rise of 10 percent of Turks identifying as 
Muslims since 2002354. This increase comes with the rise in political power of the 
Islam-oriented AKP of the same year. As the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy states Turkish secularism is at stake355. Even the influential Istanbul business 
                                                 
348
 Carroll, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. 
349
 Carroll, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. 
350
 Ozay Mehmet. Islamic identity and development: Studies of the Islamic periphery (London: 
Routledge 1990) 5.  
351
 Mehmet, Islamic identity and development, 117. 
352
 Mehmet, Islamic identity and development, 117. 
353
 Adivar in Mehmet, Islamic identity and development, 119. 
354
 Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey, vii. 
355
 Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey. 
4 Recovering a Moral Dimension of the Global Economy 76 
community ‘now favors a low-profile attitude towards the AKP’356 . The business 
community is benefiting from the religious conservative revival in Turkey because the 
AKP is maintaining a pro-Western, ‘pro-big business record’357  and applies neo-
liberal policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Economics Minister Ali 
Babacan from ‘Turkey’s largest business organization declares [that] the message of 
FDI is that I have confidence in the future of this country’358. At present the AKP has 
‘integrated its Islamist movement into the political mainstream’359  and represents 
Turkey’s ‘new elite’ 360 . The APK is ‘religiously conservative but economically 
liberal’361 and combines wealth accumulation and value conservatism in a unique 
way. Turkey’s economic and social transformation is liable to an ‘unprecedented 
amalgam of Islam, capitalism, and secular liberal democracy’362 . The appeal for 
many Turks is the fusion of an envisioned return to Ottoman ‘religiously-framed 
educational institutions and media [to] form a faithful and moral individual […]’363 that 
is economically successful and conscious of its cultural roots. Turkey under the AKP 
promises political stability the Turks have been seeking being traumatized by the 
numerous military coups. The AKP is probably as successful because it is responsive 
to the desire of the Turks to fuse their imaginary of Turkish identity with economic 
development and political stability. The party appears to democratize the country by 
allowing it ‘being religious in public’364. It should be noted that the AKP has not held 
all its promises so far. Its aggressive privatization policies have indeed broadened 
the Turkish middle class, but also increased poverty and unemployment for the rural 
population and the urban poor. 
 
Finally Turkey as nodal point of the economic worldwide web applies its own logic 
and its own meaning structures to the world-system. For Islamic identities within 
Turkey are affirmations of identity as well as moral critique on the contemporary 
world-system. They are closely monitored by Turkey’s external partners like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States (U.S.) and Europe365 
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for whom Turkey is a strategic location giving access to the Middle East and the 
Asian continent. Additionally Turkey is ‘NATO’s second largest armed force’366 and 
its political stability thus critical for NATO. It is seen as a model for a secular, Muslim 
nation and for that of particular interest to the U.S. and its policies for the broader 
Middle East. From a European perspective Turkey’s application for full membership 
of the European Union challenges Europe’s self-understanding as a geographical, 
culturally-homogeneous unit. Recent developments in Turkey’s political economy are 
therefore closely monitored. However, NATO, the U.S. and Europe have welcomed 
Erdogan’s political success despite his pro-Islamic stance because the AKP is 
Islamic and pro-Western. It is ‘less nationalistic’367 than the other parties and thus a 
more stable political ally for Europe, the United States and NATO due to its 
parliamentary stronghold. Economically the external powers view in the single-party 
government that needs ‘less than the two-third majority of seats to make 
constitutional changes’368 an ideal condition for foreign investments and economic 
alliances.  
 
4.4. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter was concerned with the cultural aspects of the Turkish economy and the 
centrality of identity for the political orientation towards Turkey’s economic 
modernization. It has answered how economic change instigates questions of identity 
and culture that are carried out on the political level also. In Turkey this process has 
led to a resurfacing of conservative religious values. The significance of political 
parties to capture the need for an ideology, a point of view that projects values onto 
the socio-cultural changes of economic development was described in relation to 
historical and economic major events in Turkey. A modern economy is here 
combined with arguably new religious Turkish identities and values. The AK Party is 
presenting the viability of a compromise, a third way. This third way enables religious 
re-orientation for a unique Turkish identity and economic structural changes for the 
sake of advancing the country economically that in turn provides ‘stability against the 
shocks from outside’369 the citizens seek. Due to the hegemony the world-system 
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represents economic agents are more than ever important carriers of cultural identity 
and hence integral to political leaders and strategies. 
 
5 Suggestions for a Refined Global Theory  79
5.1. The Double-edged Sword  
 
Talking in moral terms, one could say that globalization is both, good and evil, a 
double-edged sword that frightens and attracts, embraces and alienates us alike. 
Economic globalization means a simultaneous disintegration and novel reformation 
of previously remote identities and activities. At the core of the economic 
globalization debate are the differing perceptions of its effects on local cultures. 
Already in the 19th century Justus Möser was convinced that market forces tend to 
cancel out cultural particularities370. In fact it seems to persist as one of the fiercest 
arguments until today that global business destroys local tradition and hence must be 
tamed. Additionally the negative social effects such as the widening gap between 
poor and rich, first and third world is morally unsustainable. The sociologist Anthony 
Giddens defines globalization as ‘the intensification of world-wide social relations 
which link distant localities […]’ 371 . Due to the differences in opportunities for 
alternative lives and identities and the plurality of truths in the world, ‘it becomes 
increasingly difficult […] to re-forge social issues into effective collective action’372. 
Effectively the global economy is individuating formerly collective searches and 
manifestations of cultural identity and meaning making collective resistance more 
difficult. However as the case studies have shown, it is more and more individual or 
personal enunciations that threaten ‘global’ norms and resist standardization.  
 
Every culture seeks to apply its own logic to the processes of globalization and 
reproduce knowledge that is similarly particular whilst making a claim to universality. 
For understanding global processes one can therefore hardly rely on a global norm. 
Economic theories should be revised in order to appreciate the difference and the 
moral aspects man seeks in being an agent in the world. He wishes to insert his 
‘native culture into capitalist narrative’ 373 . When trying to understand the global 
relevance of the formation of a capitalist class in Turkey or the popularity of a satellite 
TV show in Egypt, one must combine psychological, ethical, social, cultural and 
economic theories to capture the multiple dimensions of globalization.  
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5.2. Making Money is More Complicated  
 
‘Is there anyone in the world, Meletus, who believes in human activities, and not in human 
beings?’374 
 
This thesis’ intention was to embrace the socio-cultural dimension of economic 
globalization, which the author views of utmost importance for what is at stake when 
images, technology, people and capital transgress borders. The variety of life styles, 
the coexistence of scientific and religious truths sends troubling message of 
epistemological uncertainty and ambiguity. Only if we understand that it is ideologies 
of identities bound up with the integration and adaptation to the economic web of 
trade, technology and investments, we can foresee and interpret resistances and 
counter-ideologies. Expanding economic theory in order to theorize the social and 
cultural aspects would not only explain its cultural variability, but place the human 
consequences of globalization in the spotlight.  
 
The creation of ’identities of difference’ 375  is ultimately what is cultural about 
globalization. As we know by now identities are fictional without losing their reality 
and concreteness for people’s lives. National identities are becoming less relevant. 
Hybrid, constructed identities are on the rise communicated by the media and the 
vast technological and economic changes that put ideas and ideologies in direct 
confrontation. A major impetus of this thesis is to sensitize the reader to the fact that 
capitalism is more than just a functional system that ‘glamorizes avarice and admires 
profit’376 . It is dependent upon an ethical system which bestows man’s life and 
identity with meaning. Sen argues the market capitalism of today needs to be 
expanded in order to comprise values in response to the social injustices and 
unequal distribution of goods in the world377. It appears that the first real theorization 
of capitalism by Adam Smith has been considerably misinterpreted and adjusted to 
allow for the social polarizations taking place within the world-system today. In other 
words, we need a model for global justice. A significant step towards such a global 
model will be made by a new economic theory as suggested in this paper.  
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5.3. Recuperating the Moral Dimension of the Global Economy 
 
The reductionist interpretation of self-interest in economics is implausible because it 
is exclusively ‘materialist’378. It says that an entrepreneur is led by ‘greed […] and has 
no sense of the common good’379. As the radical type of capitalism in the Western 
world is ‘without serious rivals anywhere in the world’380, it promotes a certain that is 
Western attitude to money-making that has left its ancient roots in Grecian thought 
and Protestant belief behind. Present-day capitalist culture reproduces Western 
identity because capitalism regards Komlosy is as a ‘concept, a theory, a model and 
a narrative of transformation as well as a mode of operation oriented towards profit 
maximizing production derived from a European example and a European 
perspective’381. As a result the world market today produces a certain mentality 
because the more powerful a certain market culture is, the more likely it is to spread 
its mentality. Albeit as the thesis has shown the imposing force of Western mentality 
is heavily contested and alternative mentalities coexist. For the Islamic world this 
demystification of the world through the radicalization, and rationalization of self-
interest according to purely materialist measures, poses direct threat to integrity, 
cultural autonomy and self. Western economic rules fail to provide meaning and 
identity for non-Western economies.  
 
Economic theory is not only an actual transaction paradigm, but an ideology that 
functionalizes life. Money imposes a dualism on human life as it liberates from rigid 
traditions and societal dependencies, yet creates ‘new, artificial, social constructs’382. 
It can be said that capitalism functions only because ‘it depends, in reality, on an 
influential system of values and norms’383. Sen resumes that ethics in capitalism has 
been ‘completely underestimated’384. ‘The application of formal, economic models for 
the understanding of market mechanisms is [undoubtedly] part of the standard 
methods in economic theory, yet a double-edged sword’385. It was argued throughout 
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the thesis that these models have over time separated themselves from the 
underlying relations and processes that make it work. Identities and ideologies of 
moral systems are central to economics as economic ‘exchange relations’ […] 
necessitate a solid, institutional fundament […] as well as a morale’386. ‘Capitalism as 
a system of mere profit maximization based upon the private ownership of capital 
ignores many other factors that have contributed to the increase of production and 
income’387. The many ‘non-profit oriented motives’388 are tied to man’s natural need 
for a self that ‘takes interest in its own conduct’389. The process of self-reflexivity and 
imagination of identity in the economy is hence inseparable. It was shown in the 
outset that for the initiation of the ‘early capitalist system’390 it was more than material 
self-interest and selfishness that gave rise to industrialization in Western Europe. 
Religious principles and the specific reading of self-interest as moral refinement have 
bestowed the rationalization of life with a moral value and enabled the drastic socio-
cultural changes. The author agrees with Sen’s conclusion that capitalism being 
exclusively based upon self-interest for profit-maximization is ‘a myth’391. The recipe 
for economic development is therefore to find a unique cultural nature of capitalism.  
 
Bernard Williams criticizes the inability and failure of contemporary economic theory 
to reason the ‘relations between a man's projects and his actions’392. When global 
capitalism that ‘sees agents as no more than nodes in the causal network that is to 
be manipulated to produce [utilitarian] consequence, we have lost sight of the very 
idea of agency’393. This kind of economic theory takes a view from nowhere and is 
entirely useless for describing, interpreting and forecasting developments in the 
global economy. Williams notes that ‘[the agent] is identified with his actions as 
flowing from projects or attitudes which […] he takes seriously at the deepest level, 
as what his life is about’394. Furthermore he is convinced that ‘it is absurd to demand 
of such a man […] that he should just step aside from his own project and decision 
and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires’ 395 . ‘It is to 
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alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own 
convictions […] It is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone's 
projects, including his own, and an output of optimistic decision; but this is to neglect 
the extent to which his projects and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and 
decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely 
identified [...] It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity’396. Integrity 
has a moral value and is central to agency in economics. Attacks on integrity disturb 
one’ self-image as discussed in the section on cognitive dissonance in chapter two.  
 
Tying back to Wallerstein, capitalism has given a specific economic system a degree 
of sustainability that has not been there before. It commenced about four centuries 
ago and is based upon sheer endless accumulation of capital. But more critically 
today it is based upon a value framework that is amoral and driven by socio-
economic disparities of social polarization, tariffs and poverty. The kind of capitalism 
today does in fact strive on the inequalities in the world that are its opportunities for 
widening the profit margin on sales. Western capitalism in a sense is without 
direction, bound by no higher goals than making more money. It has radicalized over 
time and abandoned former work ethics like self-discipline and hard work. Being rich 
as the ultimate goal is independent of how hard one works. In fact those that work 
the hardest, the mine workers and factory workers, receive the smallest pay. Rich 
become those that know how to take advantage of the system, how to materialize on 
the imperfect market situations, the peripheries and their powerlessness to bargain 
for just prices and fair remuneration. Today’s capitalism requires that two thirds of the 
world is poor, hence exploitable. This is why for Braudel capitalism is the ‘anti-
market’397 and bound to collapse for ‘it is in crisis’398. The capitalization on the social 
and cultural inequalities will and already has caused non-tolerable consequences 
and set free resistant forces.  
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5.4. Limitations and Strengths of Studying the Phenomenology 
of the Economy 
 
The emphasis ‘on the human will [and] human agency’399 is what makes this thesis a 
humanist account. The author has taken the courage to reveal underlying, 
philosophical and phenomenological fissures of the radical capitalist system for which 
there are no quantitative ‘hard’ facts available. This could indeed be a weakness of 
the thesis, a compromise of its scientific appeal. Yet not necessarily, as the notion of 
truth has been considerably narrowed to experimental, empiricist processes since the 
18th century. The separation of philosophy from the natural sciences has become to 
be weighted according to which one is best for enhancing knowledge. And 
knowledge came to be coded in numbers and ‘hard’ facts prioritizing physics, 
mathematics and other sciences over the Humanities. The author has purposefully 
chosen a hermeneutic approach because of the intrinsic value of observing and 
analyzing specific phenomena that are difficult to express in numbers yet extremely 
important and real for the global economy.  
 
Also a field study and personal interviews with the two businessmen and their 
employees by the author herself could have provided additional information on the 
role of identity in the Turkish economy. Two reasons have led the author to refrain 
from a personal visit of Tekbir and Ipekyol in Istanbul this time. The most pressing 
one was the limited time frame available for writing the thesis that made a collection 
and analysis of additional data in the relatively short time unfeasible. However she 
can only encourage other researchers to incorporate personal interviews with the 
Turkish businessmen if they are interested in the field of identity and the global 
cultural economy. She herself plans such a visit in the future, possibly in the frame of 
a doctoral program.  
 
The other reason for omitting an own empirical study of Tekbir and Ipekyol was the 
unlikelihood of retrieving more or extra information by interviewing Mr. Karaduman 
and Mr. Ayaydin by a personal visit. Rather it would be recommendable to interview 
other businessmen and their employees as well as political figures in order to derive 
a more conclusive picture of the political economy and the various imaginations and 
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their respective degree of influence on Turkish identity. Here one would necessitate a 
translator to conduct the interviews and overcome the language barrier. A new case 
study on different companies would also reveal how representative this particular 
case study is.  
 
Lastly one could criticize that the author takes a double stance whereby she on one 
hand challenges the universalist philosophical basis of classical economics, but on 
the other hand applies Western ‘universal’ concepts throughout her thesis. For 
instance when she stresses the importance of the individual over the collective, the 
socio-cultural over the economic and the ideals of freedom and democracy she is 
taking a universalizing perspective herself. She acknowledges to be undoubtedly 
bounded by her own cultural, linguistic, political identitarian space. Nonetheless this 
shortcoming is marginal considering the ‘pragmatic universalist’ methodology 
outlined in the beginning that legitimizes certain generalizations. The pragmatic use 
of some universal ideas enabled this exploratory and reflexive study in the first place. 
It is argued that what is universal about the concepts used is the idea of the natural 
relationship of culture, which includes ethics and identity, and economics. Especially 
the case study approach provided some ‘convincing grounding evidence’ [and is] 
appropriate in new topic areas’400. The author endeavored to apply a stringent logic 
throughout the paper in order to provide new insights. The interdisciplinary 
perspective taken was useful to ‘focus on complex interactions’401 between identity 
and ethics as part of culture and the economic sphere.  
 
For future research the author suggests to continue to refine an integrative model of 
economics that accounts for the socio-cultural dimension. She also hopes to have 
inspired a new look on cultural identities to be less based on national, ethnic terms, 
but more on hybridity and fluidity. People that emphasize certain aspects of their 
identity, be it religious, sexual or otherwise, would be less segregated and 
dichotomized. By this holistic approach to viewing identity policy-making would be 
less inclined towards taking the rejection of an imitation of Western economic culture 
by non-Western economies as a confrontation, but as a natural, legitimate means to 
express their identity. 
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A future model could expand on the present thesis and center around ‘collective 
possibilities’402  rather than global discrepancies. Eventually the historical division 
between social and economic science must be annihilated. Appadurai’s social model 
could be useful in establishing such a model for future policy-making and economic 
planning. Such outlook would produce fundamentally different research focuses and 
inspire more synthetic, integrated approaches to global issues. Preserving the 
complexity and multi-disciplinarity of economic globalization will provide more justice 
to the people affected by the capitalist world-system and improve the policies made 
by supra-national bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank (WB) and the World 
Economic Forum. Besides it will grant people inside and outside of the periphery 
humility and dignity they are to this day deprived of.  
 
The thesis made apparent the relevance of the socio-cultural factors for economic 
development and growth and reasoned that the ‘clash of fundamental values’403 
within the global economy is due to this intricate relationship. The integration of local 
economies and identities into the dominant economic system is implying a ‘great 
uncertainty’ and a ‘great questioning about the structures of knowledge’404. Hence, 
moral reasoning about making money is critical for economic agency.  
 
5.5 A Final Word on Self-interest 
 
In this final section a remark on the concept of self-interest underlying economic 
theory will be made. The author’s intention was to illustrate the historical contingency 
of ethically-framed self-interest for economic behavior. The author wishes to 
conclude this thesis by stating that due to the ‘misconception’405 about self-interest in 
‘sociological and economic discourse’406 economic theory is particular and must not 
be applied universally. Thinking from the European perspective on self-interest about 
economic globalization ultimately fails to account for the variety of interpretations of 
self-interest that exists. A correct understanding of self-interest must conceive of the 
‘historical context and the cultural milieu’407. Until now however economists from the 
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IMF, the WB and elsewhere work with the ‘old’ Western categorizations of human 
motivation being geared towards the ‘rational maximization of one’s own utility’408. 
What is needed and should be subject to future research is a new economic theory 
that deals with ‘real man’409. Ultimately, a theory must emerge that allows for fluidity 
and adaptation of self-interest so it ceases to be normative and embraces the 
‘historical plurality of self-interested conducts’410 that reach far into the present. The 
author was motivated to make the reader conscious of the limitations of ‘neo-
classical [global radical capitalism that] has accustomed us to the image of human 
beings as rational maximizers of their own self-interest’411. Instead it should be taken 
from reading this paper that self-interest is directed towards certain purposes, 
identities and ideologies that in turn serve a ‘certain way of life’412.  
 
As a consequence it is dangerous to ‘import particular doctrines of self-interest’413 
into the world and to pretend that self-interest is naturally material and about 
maximizing one’s profit. It is bound to cause resistances and misreadings of the 
diversity of cultural interpretations of selves in the global economy. The thesis on the 
ideologies of identities in the global cultural economy is to be understood as 
capitalism critique that begins with the very foundation of how we think of our selves 
in the economy. What are individuals driven by and for what purpose? The answers 
are no longer discussed despite the fact that they are historically and culturally 
specific. How capitalism is understood and conceptualized today creates a certain 
personality structure and identity that is ‘one-sided, predictable, rational and in some 
sense repressed personality’414.  
 
The thesis pointed out that self-interest as rational and utility-maximizing self is a 
historical shaping of personality during the 17th and 18th centuries. A functional 
understanding of the economy and man was seen to increase material prosperity and 
to lead to freedom and civility once the ‘violent passions that had fuelled European 
wars of religion’415 were tamed. Religious disenchantment and philosophical writings 
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on the nature of man at that time began to infuse meaning into the worldly successes. 
‘Predestination’416 theory and rational self-interest that tamed the formerly passionate, 
will-less subject to be hard-working and self-disciplined came to establish self-
interest as ‘beneficial form of human conduct’417 . At the same time the specific 
interpretation of rationally self-interested man was ‘assumed ontological 
foundation’418 from which even sociological theories extracted their basic rationale. 
However self-interest was never meant to explain all sorts of human behavior. And 
consequently Hobbes, Hume, and Smith had in mind that the sort of self-interest they 
envisioned necessitated other motivations and identities to coexist with. Because 
man is not restricting his self-interest by nature, Smith was theorizing an enlightened 
self-interest for economic development. Being rational about one’s self-interest 
meant to limit personal desires and to account for the other’s needs as well. For him 
and the other enlightenment thinkers ‘the rational pursuit of utility, far from being 
universal, is a rare moral achievement’419. Self-interest as moral capacity means ‘a 
strenuous process of moral self-disciplining [in order to] be in control of oneself and 
to control one’s impulses’ 420 .Originally self-interest is hence a moral aspect of 
economics and ‘the very antithesis of the celebration of unbridled egoism’421.  
 
The role of the self in economic theory and agency has been dealt with historically 
and then, in the second chapter, psychologically. Both those sections were pivotal to 
argue for an economic theory that includes the socio-cultural dimension of ideologies, 
identities and their meaningful relation to the outside world. We need an ‘ethical and 
practical’422 foundation for the economy that has a ‘more complete conception of 
humanity’ 423 . By consulting psychological theories and the cultural context of 
globalization the author derives a final, new definition of self. The self is ‘a subjectivity 
that is historically cultivated to meet the purposes of a particular way of life’424. The 
reader should take home the idea that global, radical economics is not about how the 
world really is, but about a proposed ‘cultural transformation’425. The rational-actor 
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model’ is a version of self-interest that is a ‘politically and culturally superimposed 
mode of conducting civil life’ 426 . It entails quests for power over ideologies of 
identities and their cultural self-understanding that is to be contested on two 
instances. First due to the cultural dogmatism it must be rejected. The normative, 
cultural power of this concept of self-interest has led to ‘economic grievances that 
contribute to Muslim resentment of the global economic order [due to its] 
unmistakable cultural, and specifically religious, dimension’427. Second, it falls short 
of depicting human identity in a correct manner and must be revised to understand 
that ‘each form of personhood has it own history […] and fashions its own ethos, and 
is directed by its own techniques to its own ends’428. The interdisciplinary perspective 
taken towards the subject of identity within economic theory has discovered a new 
self and the necessity for a new theorizing of economics to enhance understanding 
and policy-making. The discovery of self and the plurality of factors motivating 
economics lets us return to conceptualizing self-interest and self as comprising 
‘passion, emotion, desire, culture, spontaneity, morality and virtue’429 all of which 
deserve a role when thinking about the global economy.  
 
Meaning is to be recuperated in the ambiguity of the global economy by extending 
Appadurai’s global landscapes theory to integrate techno- and financescapes with 
media- and ideoscapes. This would lead to thinking about the economy as something 
inseparable from the communication and imagination of ideologies of identities 
across borders. Whilst the theoretical separation makes sense to the extent that it 
facilitates the analysis of various processes of economic globalization it implies a 
structural separation that invites scholars to look at economics just from investigating 
techno- or financescapes without having to draw onto the enmeshed human, 
motivational and discursive aspects of identity and ideology.  
 
Global business is more than a synchronization of globally dispersed production 
chains and a functionalization of culture for economic means. Instead it is a 
manifestation of a particular philosophy, an interpretation of the world that can come 
to impose identities onto newly ingested regions and their ethnic groups. For any 
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economic globalization scholar then finding out more about the reaction and 
resolution of the social and cultural within economic globalization is central to 
deepening the understanding of this complex process. For future reasoning and 
theorizing about the global economy, one must recover its moral dimension. Only 
then can we achieve an ‘economy for the people’430. 
 
 
 ‘[…] Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking: for it is merely useful for the sake of 
something else’431 
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Appendix 102 
Appendix 1: The thesis’ hypothesis visually 
 
Assumption: Human beings have the natural tendency to attribute meaning to their 
work; this meaning comes in form of cultural aspects of identity and moral principles 
of a higher purpose (those can be religious) 
 
 
Hypothesis: Capitalism as an economic system is really a cultural system and 
should be theorized as such – economic theory should be interdisciplinary and 
comprise cultural factors of identity and ethics/morals that are context-dependent 
(that is adjusted to different cultural contexts). 
 
 
Relationship of mutual contingency: ethics-work 
Main critique: notion of self-interest changes over time 
 
 
 
 
Ethics used to be a natural component of work until economic science split from 
social science and capitalist culture ‘emancipated’ itself from ethical/moral 
frameworks imposed onto it. 
 
 
Goal: Return to an ethical conception of economics and capitalism as a socio-
cultural economic system.  
17th/18th century (Adam Smith) 21st century (Wallerstein) 
Social Sciences Economic Sciences Social Sciences 
Enlightened  
Self-interest 
Economic Sciences
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Appendix 2. 
 
Table1: Selected facts on Turkey 
Population 71,892,807 (July 2008 est.) 
Religion Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 
0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews) 
Ethnic groups Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20% (estimated) 
Languages 
Turkish (official), Kurdish, Dimli (or 
Zaza), Azeri, Kabardian 
note: there is also a substantial Gagauz 
population in the European part of 
Turkey 
Country name 
conventional long form: Republic of 
Turkey  
conventional short form: Turkey 
local long form: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti  
local short form: Turkiye 
Currency Turkish lira (TRY); old Turkish lira (TRL) 
before 1 January 2005 
GDP per capita $12,900 (2007 est.) 
GDP composition by economic sector 
agriculture: 8.9%  
industry: 28.3%  
services: 62.8% (2007 est.) 
Unemployment rate 9.9% plus underemployment of 4% (2007 est.) 
Industries 
textiles, food processing, autos, 
electronics, mining (coal, chromite, 
copper, boron), steel, petroleum, 
construction, lumber, paper 
Agricultural products tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar 
beets, pulse, citrus; livestock 
Export commodities apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal 
manufactures, transport equipment 
 
 
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency. The world fact book on Turkey. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, accessed June 10, 2008.] 
 
 
Appendix 104 
Appendix 3: Film makers’ notes on Turkey’s Tigers/case study one 
 
Filmmaker Notes by Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill, PBS program ‘Turkey'sTigers’. 
Filmmakers Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill discuss the relationship between East 
and West, the challenges of shooting in Turkey, and what they learned about the 
Turks while filming the program. 
WIDE ANGLE: In “Turkey’s Tigers,” we see a portrait of Islam not often depicted in 
American media. What do you hope American audiences will learn about modern 
Turkey from this film? 
Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill: Too often we think of the so-called Islamic world 
as an impenetrable block of indistinguishable nations — painted with the attitude that 
“East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet.” But in modern 
Turkey East and West are always meeting each other at all sorts of strange and 
surprising angles. Whether it’s the high-fashion “Islamic” look you see on the catwalk 
in our documentary or the close political ties Turkey has to both the United States 
and Iran — modern Turkey is not easily classified. 
Turkey is often described in the American media as a model of democracy and 
secularism in the Muslim world. In fact, the state keeps close tabs on religion, seeing 
it both as a threat and a potential social cement. All mosques are run by the 
government. Around 99 percent of Turks are Muslims (mostly Sunni with a 
substantial Alevi-Shiite minority), but the country’s secular establishment, including 
the courts and the military, has sought for decades to restrict Islamic influence, which 
some political leaders view as an obstacle to Western-style modernization. 
Under Turkish law, women are not allowed to attend schools and or work in public 
buildings wearing headscarves. Even wives of ministers are excluded from 
government functions and formal state dinners because they wear headscarves. The 
ruling Justice and Development Party, which has its roots in the Islamic movement 
and has dominated parliament and local government since elections in 2002, has 
made no secret of its desire to lift the ban on head scarves. 
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Both Islamic and secular leaders are using the rhetoric of freedom to push forward 
their ideas, with one side demanding religious freedom to wear headscarves in public 
places, and the secularists fighting local government efforts to restrict alcohol use. 
The overriding question: Will Turkey stay in an eternal state of suspension, tense 
between secular Europe and the Islamic Middle East? Or will it eventually tilt 
definitively in one direction? 
We think that in this film audiences will see that there is probably some third way for 
Turkey — somewhere in the “twain” zone where East and West are blending — 
especially in business. 
Politically influential, pragmatic and devout — Turkey’s Muslim entrepreneurs offer 
many parallels to pious Christian businessmen in the United States — and there’s no 
simple way to categorize either group. 
WIDE ANGLE: You’ve both spent your careers shooting documentaries 
internationally, from Cuba to China to Iraq. What are some of the particular 
challenges you faced while filming in Turkey? 
Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill: According to Turkish law, no public employees can 
go on record with the media without permission from some place above in the 
bureaucracy — this can make setting up scenes at schools or any public buildings (or 
interviewing a street-sweeper) a somewhat Kafka-esque adventure. 
It is also virtually impossible to get access to anyone in the Turkish military — and 
the military plays a substantial role in the Turkish state. 
WIDE ANGLE: The film profiles businessmen at the heart of modern Anatolian Tiger 
economy. What is the role of women in the business realm of Turkish society? 
Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill: In the board rooms of Istanbul women seemed to 
be fairly well represented — but their role in the booming businesses of Kayseri was 
almost non-existent. Though the Turkish economy is dominated by men, things did 
appear to be slowly changing — especially at the top of the socio-economic scale. A 
number of businessmen in Kayseri whose wives wore the headscarf and stayed at 
home, had daughters whom they hoped would get involved in business — whether 
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they wore or did not wear a headscarf did not seem to make a difference. In Istanbul 
where there was a more established secular tradition, women were much more likely 
to take an active and visible role in business. 
WIDE ANGLE: Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul seems to embrace democratic 
freedoms, but critics accuse the AKP of quietly re-introducing an Islamic government 
to Turkey. How receptive was the Deputy Prime Minister to participating in the 
documentary and did you feel that he was an open subject? 
Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill: We were extremely privileged to have a great 
degree of access to Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as he made room in his busy 
schedule for us to spend an extraordinary amount of time with him and his family. He 
had invited us to his country house at one point — and we were disappointed that his 
busy schedule shuttling (at the time) between Washington, Moscow and Tehran 
prevented that from happening. But generally he was open and warm with us. He is 
very proud of what he believes the AK Party stands for and has accomplished — and 
very proud of his native Kayseri. 
 
[Source: ‘Turkey’s Tigers’. Wide Angle. Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). By Jon Alpert and 
Matthew O’Neill. August 22, 2006, available online: 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/jon-alpert-and-matthew-oneill/366/, 
accessed February 5, 2008.] 
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